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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Beginning with Freud's (1900/1967, p. 284, footnote) reference to Poetzl's (1917/1960) study of the role
of unnoticed stimuli in dream formation, many psychoanalysts have viewed subliminal perception as an important
research method.

For example, Klein (1959, 1967) used the

method to investigate the differential effects of

periph~

eral versus focal awareness of stimuli and ideas.

Here,

inputting stimuli at subliminal levels was viewed as a
means to manipulate peripheral trains of thought.

Pine

(1964) noted that in many studies, the effect of a subliminal stimulus was often indirectly or symbolically related to the stimulus content.

These transformations of

subliminal stimuli were thought to result from primary
process thinking (i.e., use of condensation, symbolization, and displacement).

For these authors, subliminal

perception was seen as a powerful tool for studying cognitive processes hypothesized to occur at unconscious or
preconscious levels.
More recently, Lloyd Silverman and his associates
at New York University have published over 25 studies
(summarized in Silverman, 1976) using a laboratory tech1
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nique termed "subliminal psychodynamic activation."

These

studies typically present some wish- or conflict-related
stimulus at subliminal levels and compare its effect on
behavior to that of some (relatively) neutral stimulus.
Relationships between particular unconscious conflicts and
psychopathologies hypothesized by psychoanalysts have been
investigated with this method.

For example, Silverman and

Silverman (1967) found that subliminal presentation of
stimuli containing aggressive content resulted in increases
in measured thought disorder in a group of schizophrenics.

Predicted results have also been obtained with groups of
depressives (Rutstein & Goldberger, 1973), stutterers
(Silverman, Klinger, Lustbader, Farrel, & Martin, 1972),
homosexual males (Silverman, Kwawer, Wolitzky, & Coren,
1973), insect phobics (Silverman, Frank, & Dachinger,
1974) and overweight women {Silverman, Martin, Ungaro, &
Mendelsohn, 1978) •

In a review of his work, Silverman

{1976) concludes that the results offer strong support for
the psychoanalytic notion that conflicts occurring below
awareness can account for many specific symptomatologies.
Given the complexity of many of the stimuli used and the
wide range of behavioral effects observed, these results
are not easily explained by most current theories of visual
information processing {e.g., Neisser, 1967).
Despite a prodigious outpouring of supportive research from Silverman's laboratory, the few independent
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replications of his work found in the literature have obtained disappointing results (Greenberg, 1977; Emmelkamp
& Straatman, 1976).

In an attempt to encourage replica-

tion and to demonstrate the effects of the method on a
type of behavior not previously studied, Silverman, Ross,
Adler and Lustig (1978) report results of four experiments
using a relatively simple methodology and college males as
subjects.

The major intention of each experiment was to

manipulate, through subliminal presentation of conflictrelated material, the degree of oedipal conflict in the
subjects and to observe the effects of this on subjects'
accuracy in dart-throwing competition.

Thus, the study

purports to test the psychoanalytic proposition that males
can unconsciously inhibit themselves in competitive performance because winning has the hidden connotation of
defeating father for mother's love (Beisser, 1961).
In an attempted replication of the major parts of
this study, Swanson (Note 1) obtained results that were
quite different from those of the original study.

For

this author, exposure to the BEATING DAD IS OK stimulus
led to no significant change in subjects' dart scores,
while exposure to BEATING DAD IS WRONG led to significant
increases, a finding in the opposite direction of that obtained by the original authors.
The present investigation includes a further replication of this study using the two BEATING DAD stimuli
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in the dart-throwing paradigm.

An additional control group

receives identical treatment except that the "priming" procedures used in the earlier studies are omitted.

The re-

sults bear on Silverman's (1965) assertion regarding the
necessity of these procedures for normal subjects and on
the more general issue of the role of drive activation in
subliminal perception research (e.g., Klein & Holt, 1960).
Additional personality and historical data is collected
in order to more systematically evaluate the importance of

subject differences for this paradigm.

In particular,

subjects are asked about their religious history, as this
may in part determine meanings given to the words "ok,"
"wrong," and "dad."

Subjects are also asked the word they

use to refer to their fathers.

These data may shed light

on the relevance of idiosyncratic and associative meanings
given to stimulus words.

Finally, personality inventory

data is collected in order to explore identifiable personality differences associated with subliminal effect in
the dart paradigm.
Studies of subliminal perception have often obtained weak or ambiguous results and have only rarely
been replicated (for reviews, see Dixon, 1971; Wolitzky &
Wachtel, 1973; Swanson, Note 1}.

One possible reason for

the apparent fragility of subliminal effects is that the
stimulus contents used in many experiments may be insufficient in their emotional impact and so have negligible
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effect on primary process or non-conscious mental events.
In addition, many studies have been criticized for employing dependent measures insensitive to the subtle effects of subliminal stimulation on peripheral trains of
thought (Klein, 1967).

The second part of the present

investigation addresses itself to these criticisms by including stimuli with highly aggressive content and employing word association tasks as dependent measures.
Following the replication procedures discussed
above, subjects are subliminally exposed to the verbal
stimulus DESTROY FATHER and pictorial stimulus of a younger
male attacking an older male figure.

Subsequent word as-

sociations are compared to those following subliminal
presentations of the (relatively) neutral verbal stimulus
PEOPLE WALKING and associated pictoral stimulus.

Follow-

ing Silverman (1976) , it is hypothesized here that the
highly aggressive stimuli will arouse unconscious conflict
reflected by disturbances in subjects' associative processes.

In both these and replication procedures, stimulus

order is randomized and the experimenter blind to stimulus
content.

Finally, each subject completes a discrimination

task using experimental stimuli as a check on the availability of supraliminal partial cues.
In order to place Silverman's research program in
historical perspective, earlier studies using the subliminal perception paradigm to test various psychoanalytic
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propositions are reviewed in the following section.
Studies using word association as a dependent measure are
given special attention.

This is followed by a summary of

methodological and theoretical criticisms of the paradigm
and a critical review of Silverman's work.

Methods and

results of the current study are presented in subsequent
sections.

Finally, results are discussed as they bear on

issues in subliminal perception research (particularly
Silverman's program), visual information processing, and
psychoanalytic personality theory.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE
Dixon (1971) has traced the notion of subliminal
perception to the writings of Democritus, Plato, and
Aristotle.

Systematic research is generally considered to

have begun with Suslowa's (1863; cited by Wolitzky &
Wachtel, 1973) study of the effects of weak electrical
stimulation upon the two-point threshold, and Pierce and
Jastrow's (1884; cited by Dixon, 1971) findings that subjects judged weights at a better than chance rate even
when they expressed no subjective confidence in their
judgments.

Guided by Freud's notion of the role of day

residue in dream formation, Poetzl (1917/1960) published
an important study in which subjects were exposed to pictures of landscapes tachistoscopically and asked to draw
and describe what they had seen.

Parts of the stimulus

that were unnoticed following tachistoscopic exposure frequently appeared in the content of subjects' dreams later
that night.

Except for replications of Poetzl's study by

Malamud and Linder (1931) and Allers and Telers (1924/
1960), little was published in the area until the 1950s.
The voluminous literature on subliminal perception
published since that time can be divided into three main
7
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lines of investigation (Wolitzky & Wachtel, 1973) •

The

first line of research, usually undertaken within the
orientation of psychophysics or signal detection theory,
attempts to determine the information-processing limits of
the perceptual apparatus.

Bevan's (1964) experiments on

the effect of subliminal anchors upon psychophysical
judgments are typical of this research.

A second line

has grown from the classical conditioning paradigm.

These

studies usually look at verbal conditioning without awareness, focusing largely on establishing experimental analogues of therapeutically effective learning (e.g.,
Greenspoon, 1955; Spielberger, 1962).

These two areas of

research have been periodically reviewed (Adams, 1957;
McConnell, Cutler, & McNeil, 1958; Bevan, 1964; Dixon, 197l)
and so will not be considered here.
The third line of research stems largely from "New
Look 11 approaches to perception.

Beginning with McGinnies

(1949) report that taboo words had elevated recognition
thresholds compared to other words, many studies followed
which investigated the relationship between perception and
personality processes.

Much of this research was guided by

psychoanalytic notions of preconscious and unconscious
thinking, primary and secondary process thinking, and conflict and defense.

For example, recent work by Erdelyi and

Kleinbard (1978) and Erdelyi and Goldberg (1979) bears on
psychoanalytic notions of repression and the retrievability
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of lost ("unconscious") memories.
Among New Look investigations using a subliminal
perception paradigm, perhaps the theoretical and empirical
work of George Klein (1959, 1967) is most significant.
Klein (1970) was interested in the issue of the differential effects of peripheral versus focal awareness of stimuli and ideas.

He proposed the model of "schema activa-

tion" (Klein & Holt, 1960) by which subliminal or incidental inputs are likely to activate drive-related ideas and
lead to behavioral effects under certain subject and stimulus conditions.

As will be seen, Silverman's (1976)

recent work on "subliminal psychodynamic activation" appears closely related to ideas advanced by.- Klein.

Before

considering Silverman's research program however, a partial
review of studies using the subliminal perception paradigm
to test various psychoanalytic hypotheses, an examination
of studies involving word association, and a consideration
of methodological and theoretical criticisms of the paradigm are advanced.
Psychoanalytic Theory and Subliminal
Perception Research
As Pine (1964) notes, a major reason for interest
in the effects of subliminal or incidental (outside focal
awareness) stimuli has been the hope that this research
would permit controlled study of thought processes operating
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outside of awareness.

Much of the research was guided by

the notions of primary and secondary process thinking and
the role of day residue in dream formation advanced by
Freud (1900/1967, Chapter VII).

In order to study the

workings of these hypothesized processes, several different
methods for presenting stimuli have been used.

In some

studies (e.g., Pine, 1961), the critical stimuli are presented at above threshold intensities, while the subjects'
attention is diverted to a separate focal task.

As stimuli

are not presented at a level below an independently determined threshold, this method is more properly termed "incidental" stimulation (see Dixon, 1971, for further discussion).

Other studies (e.g., Klein, Spence, Holt, &

Gourevitch, 1958) have used a backward masking method involving brief exposure of one (A) stimulus immediately
followed by exposure to another (B) stimulus which is
supraliminal.

The effect of the unreported A-stimulus on

subjects' reactions to the B-stimulus is analyzed.

The

most frequently used method involves presentation of stimuli at intensities or durations below some independently
determined threshold of awareness (e.g., Spence & Holland,
1962; all of Silverman's work).

Early research in the

area (reviewed by Pine, 1964) appears based on the assumption that stimuli presented by any of these methods would
bypass the mechanisms that govern the intake of supraliminal stimuli.

Being less subject to critical judgment
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and inhibitory control, these stimuli we·re assumed to more
directly effect preconscious and primary process mental
events.

By looking at the influence of these stimuli on

behavior, it was hoped that the workings of these thought
processes would become more clear.
Wolitzky and Wachtel (1973) note that the influence
of subliminal stimulation has been demonstrated on a wide
variety of behaviors including:

trait attributions (Klein,

Spence, Holt, & Gourevitch, 1958; Eagle, 1959; Smith,
Spence, & Klein, 1959), drawings (Klein, et al., 1958),
guessing (Spence, 1961), reaction time (Spence & Bressler,
1962), visual illusions (Smith & Henriksson, 1955) , bias
in intentional recall (Spence & Holland, 1962; Spence,
1964}, TAT-like stories (Pine, 1960, 1961), Rorschach content (Silverman & Silverman, 1964) , and formal aspects of
thought (Silverman, 1967} . 1
The influence of subliminal stimulation on dreams,
images, and other fantasy productions has probably been
most extensively studied.

In the first study on this

topic, Poetzl (1917/1960} exposed pictures of landscapes
tachistoscopically for about 1/100 of a second and asked
subjects to draw and describe what they had seen.

Poetzl

1 Given the large number of studies to be discussed,
no attempt will be made here to analyze individual studies
on methodological or theoretical grounds. Instead, criticisms applicable to many of the studies are discussed in
the following section. Then, the work of Silverman is
critically examined in some detail.
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found that parts of the stimulus that were unnoticed following tachistoscopic exposures tended to appear later in
dream content.

Allers and Teler (1924/1960) extended

Poetzl's findings using free-association and imagery tasks
the day following stimulus exposure.
Since then, a number of investigators have pursued
these findings further.

Fisher (1954) showed that un-

noticed parts of tachistoscopically presented pictures
tended to appear in dreams and suggested that these stimulus elements were influenced by unconscious wishes and
primary process transformations.

Using more rigorous

techniques of threshold measurement, scoring criteria, and
statistical analysis, he later demonstrated the effect of
subliminal stimuli on both dream and image content (Fisher
& Paul, 1959; Paul & Fisher, 1959).

Shevrin and Luborsky

(1958) reported supporting evidence and found that noticed
aspects of the stimuli were also included in dreams.
Eriksen (1960) criticized the foregoing studies for
ignoring the issue of base rates for appearance of ideas
in fantasy without prior stimulation.

A related problem is

that if a subject perceives even one element of the stimulus correctly (e.g., a boat), he is bound to fantasy other
objects (e.g., a lake, pier) normally associated with the
perceived object.

As some of these associated objects are

likely to have been in the original picture, a spurious
"emergence" effect may arise which has nothing to do with
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below-threshold perception of the previously unreported
elements.

Eriksen also notes that subjects may have dif-

ferent criteria for reporting what they saw right after
exposure and for reports following an imagery task.

Thus,

"recovery" effects may reflect only a lower confidence
criterion for report.

Incorporating some of the controls

suggested by Eriksen (1960}, Hilgard (1962} investigated
whether fantasy experience might facilitate recovery of
initially unreported elements in a post-fantasy intentional
recall task.

Ambiguous results were obtained as judges

rarely had great assurance that genuine recoveries were
being scored.

Johnson and Eriksen (1961) obtained no sub-

liminal recovery effect in a replication of the Shevrin and
Lubarsky (1958) study with controls for base rate production of stimulus related ideas.

Dixon (1971) argues how-

ever that this failure to replicate may be due to the
limited opportunities subjects had to demonstrate recovery.
In carefully controlled studies which appear to
have met Eriksen's (1960) criticisms, Giddan (1967) and
Haber and Erdelyi (1967) demonstrated subjects' recovery of
initially unavailable material.

In the Haber and Erdelyi

study, the experimental group saw a picture briefly, attempted to recall it, then gave extensive free associations, followed by a second recall attempt.
groups were used.

Two control

A "dart-control" group played darts in-

stead of free associating, and a "yoked-control" group was
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shown the initial recall attempts of experimental subjects
rather than the original stimuli, and were then treated in
a way identical to that of the experimental group.

Com-

parisons of initial and post-association recall drawings
showed that the improvement in recall of the experimental
group was superior to that of either control groups, indicating that free associations resulted in the recovery of
initially unavailable material.

The results were taken to

support the psychoanalytic hypothesis that below-conscious
psychic material continues to influence and manifest itself
in a variety of behaviors.

They also support the thera-

peutic claim that free-association (or other fantasy production techniques) aids in the recovery of below-conscious
material.

In the same vein, Erdelyi's more recent work

(e.g., Erdelyi & Kleinbard, 1978) has focused on the growth
of recall for pictures (and not words) over periods of up
to one week after initial stimulus presentation.
The foregoing studies on recovery of initially
unavailable material stem originally from Freud's (1900/
1967) theory of the role of day residue (unnoticed stimuli)
in dream formation.

Here, barely noticed, unassimilated

sensory impressions of the day are "selected" for dream
content because of their resonance with unconscious wishes.
They emerge in the dream as derivative representations of
the wish due to the requirements of censorship and the
nature of unconscious thinking.

A somewhat different per-
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spective for looking at subliminal perception research
stems loosely from Freud's (1900/1967, 1911/1958} distinction between primary process (usually unconscious, primitive, non-logical, and drive-dominated) and secondary
process (conscious, intentional, reality-oriented} thinking.

Klein's (1959, 1967) work on the interaction of cen-

tral and peripheral trains of thought reflects this perspective.

For Klein (1967) , an important problem was

specifying the conditions under which peripheral ideation
will intrude upon or become incorporated into conscious,
intentional thinking.

He hoped to shed light on the role

of consciousness in thinking (Klein & Holt, 1960) and to
specify the conditions determining behavioral effects of
peripherally aroused trains of thought.

Assuming that sub-

liminal stimulation would arouse peripheral trains of
thought, the strategy here was to compare the effects of
subliminal or incidental stimuli to those of supraliminal
or focal stimuli.
Examination of studies which directly compare the
effects of subliminal and supraliminal stimulation gives
no clear-cut answer to the question of whether and how
these effects differ.

As noted earlier, Poetzl's (1917/

1960) claim that unnoticed stimuli were more likely than
noticed stimuli to appear in subsequent dreams was refuted
by Shevrin and Lubarsky (1958).

Fisher (1960) presents

evidence suggesting that inclusion of a stimulus in a dream
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is a complex interaction between awareness versus nonawareness of the stimulus, subject's conflicts and defenses, and meanings of the stimulus to the subject.

Simi-

larly, Spence and Ehrenberg (1964} found that food deprivation was the key variable related to bias in recall,
whether the stimulus "cheese" was presented above or below
threshold.
Discussing the range of subliminal effects, Pine
(1964} introduced the distinction between "direct" and
"indirect" effects of stimuli.

Direct effects are those

that appear to have a relatively close or logical relationship to the initial stimulus, though are not literal replicas of it.

For example, Zuckerman (1960} found that sub-

liminal presentation of the messages "writemore" or "don't
write" resulted in significantly longer or shorter TAT
stories.

Interestingly, supraliminal presentations of the

stimuli produced
lengths.

~

consistent differences in story

Here, it appears that supraliminal stimuli can be

used as appropriate or discarded as irrelevant depending on
the subject's intentions.

Smith, Spence and Klein (1959)

presented either the word "happy" or "angry" masked by a
supraliminal picture of a face that was affectively
neutral.

The stimulus words biased responses towards more

positive or more negative descriptions of the face, though
the words themselves were rarely used in descriptions.
Instead, common associates and words logically related to
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the stimulus words were often used, while remote symbolic
associates were not.
Indirect effects are those \vhich are not obviously
related to the initial stimulus.

They include symbolic

transformations of the original stimulus and often suggest
primary process thinking (i.e., use of condensation, symbolization, displacement).

Pine (1960) illustrated in-

direct effects in a study where subjects read a focal passage while overhearing another passage read in an adjacent
room (incidental stimulus) •

Though the focal passage (em-

phasizing the phallic-aggressive aspects of a hook) influenced subsequent TAT stories in an undistorted manner,
the incidental passage (emphasizing the oral-passive aspects of a cow) emerged in an indirect, distorted manner.
Indirect effects included an increase in themes of passive
and nurturant human relationships, but not an increase in
cow-like content.

Reviewing this issue, Wolitzky and

Wachtel (1973) conclude that while indirect effects are
less likely with supraliminal stimuli, subliminal stimuli
can give rise to both direct and indirect effects given
appropriate response measures.

The issue of the differen-

tial effects of subliminal versus supraliminal stimuli
appears to be a complex one probably involving other variables such as subjects' current drive state and intentional
set.
Numerous other studies have investigated subject
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variables and stimulus conditions which facilitate or inhibit subliminal effects.

These have been recently re-

viewed by Wolitzky and Wachtel (1973) and by Dixon (1971)
who concludes that subliminal effects are facilitated when
subjects are in a low state of arousal, attention is unselective or broadened, and cognitions are intuitive,
global, symbolic, and unbound by logical restraints.

These

conclusions have recently been complicated by Sackein,
Packer, and Gur's (1977) report of an interaction between
hemisphericity and induced cognitive set ("intuitive" or
"analytic") on subliminal effects.
Of the models advanced by various psychoanalytic
writers to explain these results, the most representative
is the "schema activation" model proposed by Klein and Holt
(1960).

They define a schema as an organized group of

memory traces, including both conceptual associates and
drive-related derivatives.

They assume that every percep-

tual process includes scanning of memory schemata so that
incoming stimuli can be recognized and take on meaning.
Further, any schema may be activated by:

(a) sets or

anticipations, (b) the scanning process that selects traces
which match incoming stimuli, and (c) connections to drives.
The results of Poetzl (1917/1960) and followers are interpreted by Klein and Holt to indicate that stimuli can activate relevant schema and lead to behavioral effects even if
they are not consciously noticed.

Stimuli that make con-
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tact with an active drive schema seem to have an advantage
for recovery.

They note that in masking studies, the first

or A-stimulus will activate certain schemas.

If these are

relevant to some ambiguous property of the second or Bstimulus, reactions to the second stimulus will be biased.
If the stimulus is a brief flash, the authors write that it
may emerge into imagery if the subject can suspend realistic, problem-oriented thinking.

Thus, schema activated by

the stimulus become more available relative to other
schema.
The foregoing model is part of a larger theoretical
framework (Klein, 1967) which assumes that in addition to
conscious concerns and focal intentions, there are concurrent trains of thought in a state of activation that also
make claims on response channels.

Insofar as subliminal or

incidental stimulation can be considered to activate these
peripheral trains of thought, the method offers a way to
study their emergence in various response channels.
Subliminal Perception Research and
Word Association
Dixon (1971) reports unpublished data showing
elicitation of associative responses by subliminally presented stimuli.

Subjects were subliminally exposed to the

numerals "1," "2," or "6" and asked to guess their identity.

Only the responses "one," "two," or "six" were
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allowed.

When "6" was presented, subjects tended to re-

spond with "six."

The stimulua "1" however, tended to

evoke "two" as a response.

Similarly, Worthington and

Dixon (1964) found a tendency for subjects to respond with
the next highest number following subliminal presentations
of numbers between one and nine.

Dixon (1971) interprets

these results as support for the tendency of subliminal
input to trigger responses associated to rather than identical with the original stimuli.

He argues that studies

of associative responses provide the most important evidence that subjects respond to the meaning rather than to
the structure of subliminal stimuli.
Two groups of studies are directly relevant to this
issue of the associative nature of responses to subliminal
stimuli.

In addition to the data mentioned above, two

other studies by Dixon are pertinent.

Dixon (1956) asked

subjects to write down the first word that carne to mind in
response to a supraliminal cue which followed subliminal
presentations of words.

Contrary to initial expectation,

the responses given by subjects were not identical to the
stimuli.

A positive relationship between emotionality of

stimuli and latency of response was found however, indicating that subjects had responded to the meaning of the
stimuli.

A post hoc analysis revealed what Dixon calls the

"Freudian" nature of subjects' associative responses (e.g.,
the stimulus "penis .. followed by the response "cheroot").
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In a related study, Dixon (1958) asked subjects to say the
first word that came to mind at a visual signal.

Again, he

found responses frequently had a "Freudian" relationship to
stimulus words.

Subjects' GSRs were higher during presen-

tations of emotional compared to neutral words though
latency of response was not differentially affected.

A

week after the experiment proper, subjects were able to
match the associations they had given earlier to the original words (now presented supraliminally) at a better than
chance rate.
In a replication attempt of .the later studies,
Fuhrer and Eriksen (1960) found that subjects could later
match their associations to stimuli only when they had
first been presented at brightness levels which allowed detection of the presence of the stimulus.

A control group

presented the stimuli upside-down and backward performed as
well on the matching task as the experimental group.

These

authors conclude that matching on the basis of available
structural cues (e.g., word length) could have accounted
for Dixon's results.

Banreti-Fuchs (1967) found that

latency of associative response was unrelated to emotionality of subliminally presented stimulus words.

In a

second experiment, subjects were asked to guess the numbers on a card held by the experimenter while they watched
a brightly illuminated screen upon which a "5" was periodically flashed.

Only when the "5" was presented at avail-
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able or partially available levels did subjects guess this
nuwber more often than when no figure was flashed.
In response to tnesefailed replication attempts,
Dixon (1968, 1971) argues persuasively that they differed
in important ways from the original studies.

He notes that

both replications presented the subliminal stimuli at the
same time as the signal to respond, while stimuli preceded
response signal in the originals.

He argues that this

could have diverted subjects' attention from the stimulus
at the critical moment.

Regarding Banreti-Fuchs' (1967)

second experiment, he notes that the black circle in which
the number was flashed could have acted against subliminal
registration at the retinal level.

Also, subjects fully

aware of the "5" being presented gave that number on only
136 of 540 trials.

Dixon's explanation is that subjects

had a set to guess numbers on a card held by the experimenter rather than to say the number being flashed.

That

no subliminal effect was observed is consistent with
Allison's (1963) findings and Klein and Holt's (1960) proposition that for a subliminal stimulus to be effective,
there must be no competing cognitive structures.

Noting

the fragility of subliminal effects, Dixon (1971) concludes
that these replication attempts "show how easy it is to
prevent a weak stimulus from having an effect on behavior
(p.

78)."
The second group of relevant studies involves word
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association as a dependent measure following subliminal
stimulation with groups of schizophrenics.

Silverman and

Spiro (1976b) presented pictures of humans (man reading a
newspaper vs. menacing looking man with dagger in hand) or
of animals (lion charging with teeth bared vs. bird with
wings spread) designed to compare effects of aggressive and
neutral stimuli.

Responses to word association tests were

collected subsequent to subliminal stimulation and were
compared for number of deviant responses.

These included

loose, personal, and clang associations, repetitions of
stimulus word, failure to respond, blocking, and multi-word
responses.

Each deviant response was scored from one to

three reflecting the degree of deviation.

An inter-judge

reliability coefficient of .95 was reported.

For their 40

schizophrenic subjects, associations following either aggressive stimulus presentation were judged significantly
more deviant than those following neutral stimuli.

Mea-

sures involving story recall and "projection of aggression"
were not affected in this study.

Silverman and Spiro

(1968) essentially replicated this finding with 32 schizophrenic subjects and pictures of animals.

Here, supra-

liminal presentation of the same stimuli produced no differential effect on word associations.
Finally, Silverman, Spiro,

~veisberg,

and Candell

(1969) presented a variety of drive-related stimuli to 52
schizophrenic subjects.

Stimuli included words and pic-
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tures of humans described as neutral ("Men Talking"),
libidinal ( "Fuck A Woman") , merging ("Mommy And I Are One"),
and aggressive ("Destroy Mother").

A set of milder "im-

plicit" stimuli consisting of pictures of animals related
to each theme was also presented.

With the explicit ag-

gressive stimuli, the authors found the predicted effect on
word associations but not for a story recall task.

The irn-

plicit aggressive stimuli affected story recall but not
word association.

This failure to replicate earlier re-

sults with the implicit aggressive stimuli was attributed
to a subject group difference involving length of hospitalization.

Additionally, neither libidinal or merging stirn-

uli had an effect on word association or story recall.

The

present author is aware of no published independent replication attempts of Silverman's work with word association.
Consideration of his overall research program follows a
review of the major criticisms of the subliminal perception
paradigm.
Critiques of the Subliminal
Perception Paradigm
Many of the studies reviewed above could have been
criticized on various grounds, the most common being small
sample size, weak or ambiguous results, and lack of independent replication.

In addition, many studies fail to

report relevant details such as illumination levels,
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stimulus size and contrast, method for determining threshold, and length of dark adaption.

Because of these prob-

lems and an unknown number of negative results, the results of these studies must be regarded as tentative and
interpreted with caution.

The sequence of subliminal

studies suggests that often when researchers are dissatisfied with weak results, they think of some possible mediating variable and then control for it in a subsequent
study.

Even if positive results are then obtained, sys-

tematic investigations of the new variable and replications
are rarely reported.

This apparent pattern has resulted in

a plethora of variables possibly relevant to subliminal
effects with little systematic knowledge about any one.
Further, little attention is paid to establishing the reliability of earlier studies.

Although there has recently

been increased acceptance of the phenomenon due to use of
signal detection techniques and persuasive theoretical accounts (e.g., Dixon, 1971; Erdelyi, 1974; Walker, 1978),
some writers continue to question the validity of the concept (e.g., Neisser, 1967; Wiener & Kleespies, 1968).
Before discussing the research program of Silverman
and associates, it will be helpful to review the major
methodological and theoretical criticisms that have been
directed towards subliminal perception research.

The pur-

pose here is not to evaluate the overall validity of the
paradigm (see Dixon, 1971) but to lay the groundwork for
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judging the merits of a particular research program.
In his review of the literature on discrimination
and learning without awareness, Eriksen (1960) notes that
terms like "conscious," "unconscious," and "awareness" are
often defined differently across studies.

Especially im-

portant to studies using an absolute threshold paradigm is
the operational definition of threshold of awareness.
Eriksen notes that this is usually defined in terms of subjects' verbal report, thus placing a burden on the adequacy
of the language to reflect the richness of perceptual experience.

Thus, the threshold of a given subject depends

on several variables, including:

adequacy of the experi-

menter's questions, use or lack of use of a ready signal,
whether or not a forced-choice format is employed, and the
adequacy of the scale used to classify subjects' answers.
He suggests drawings or use of forced-choice methods may
reveal that subjects are aware of more than they can verbally report.
Bevan (1964) and Eriksen (1960) note that threshold
is a statistical estimate of something that varies over
time and is commonly described as the point at which a subject correctly discriminates (either a stimulus from a
blank field or one stimulus from another) at a 50 percent
rate.

Because of this, subjects may sometimes be aware of

the stimulus even when presented below this level.

This

could create the false impression of a subliminal effect.
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Clearly, the subliminal stimulus should be presented at a
level below the range of values from which the threshold
was derived.

In response to these cogent criticisms and

suggestions for determining threshold, many recent studies
(e.g., Zwosta &

Z~nhausern,

1969), have employed more

rigorous threshold procedures using signal detection techniques to separate sensitivity from criterion factors.
Studies using a masking paradigm have also been
criticized by Eriksen (1960) for rarely including careful
threshold determinations (e.g., Smith, Spence, & Klein,
1958).

He notes that in the study cited, some control sub-

jects alerted to the fact that words would be flashed prior
to the picture were able to detect the A-stimulus.

Neisser

(1967) criticizes the backward masking paradign on evolutionary grounds.

Given the specialized nature and un-

usualness of backward masking, he doubts that evolution
would have equipped the mind with unconscious mechanisms
for dealing with it.

Dixon (1971) counters this argument

claiming that natural selection probably favored organisms
losing the least information from the environment.
Neisser (1967} also criticizes the Smith et al.
(1958} study for the possibility that "demand characteristics" were operating.

In particular, he points out that

the experimenter may have known the order of the A-stimulus
exposures and so influenced subjects' reports of the Bstimulus accordingly.

In the same vein, he criticizes
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studies using free association measures where the experimenter knows which are the critical cue words.

Significant

here is the attempted replication of Spence (1964) by
Bruel, Ginsberg, Lukomnik, and Schrneidler (1966).

Using

the same free association task as the original experiment,
they obtained non-significant results when using an experimenter naive to the hypothesis.

However, an informed

experimenter instructed to emphasize the critical cue words
also obtained non-significant results.

As Dixon (1971)

notes, the mechanisms underlying the alleged operation of
"demand characteristics" in these studies are unknown and
may involve communication processes on the same order of
myste~iousness

as subliminal perception.

In any event,

experimental controls guarding:cqqainst this possibility are
necessary for straightforward interpretation of results.
Perhaps the most cogent criticism (at least the
most publically debated) of the subliminal perception paradigm is that the availability of partial stimulus cues may
account for the observed effects.

Advanced by Goldiamond

(1958) and Eriksen (1960) as a possible explanation of perceptual defense studies, the position is stated most
clearly by Kempler and Wiener (1963).

The later authors

draw a distinction between one-process and two-process
views of perception.

Briefly, the two-process view (their

example, Klein et al., 1958) assumes the existence of two
relatively independent perceptual processes; a supraliminal
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one operating within awareness and a subliminal one operating outside awareness.

Further, the subliminal process

can make affective or evaluative reactions to the stimulus
before the subject can discriminate and report it.

Thus,

the meaning of a stimulus is apprehended prior to correct
recognition.

The one-process view posits a single percep-

tual process described by a monotonic relationship between
stimulus intensity or duration and response strength.
Thus, lowered stimulus intensity will lead to impoverished
responses, but is not expected to produce qualitatively
different responses.

Kempler and Wiener argue that, in

studies obtaining subliminal effects, refined threshold
procedures would reveal the availability of partial cues to
which subjects respond in a predictable manner.

Differ-

ences in response to weak inputs are seen by the authors as
"a function of differential response characteristics of a
subject (or between subjects) to the specific seen part
cues" (1963, p. 352, their

emphasis)~

Guthrie and Wiener (1966) offered empirical evidence for the "part-cue response-characteristic" model as a
tenable explanation of results obtained by Eagle (1959).
Eagle used the masking paradigm in which either an aggressive or benevolent picture was immediately followed by
supraliminal exposure of a neutral picture.

Subjects'

ratings of the neutral Ficture varied systematically with
the different masked stimuli.

Noting that the two masked
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stimuli appeared to vary in structural attributes as well
as in content, Guthrie and Wiener asked subjects to rate
supraliminal presentations of line drawings varying in
angularity and line thickness.

As predicted, angular lines

were rated negatively while curved lines were rated positively.

To show that this structural cue may have been

available to Eagle's subjects, they demonstrated that subjects rated the original aggressive stimulus as more angular than the benevolent stimulus when presented in an
ascending series (starting below threshold).

Finally, they

constructed stimuli which varied in angularity and thematic
content (presence or absence of a gun) and presented these
as stimuli masked by an ambiguous supraliminal stimulus.
As predicted, subjects' ratings of the ambiguous stimulus
varied significantly with the angularity of the masked
stimulus and not

wi~~

the presence or absence of the gun.

In addition, the closer to recognition threshold the angular masked stimulus was presented, the more negative
ratings were given.

The authors conclude that predictable

differences in response to available structural cues can
account for the behavior ascribed to subliminal perception.
Responding to this study, Silverman and Spiro
(1967a) collected subjects' ratings of angularity of aggressive and neutral stimuli used in earlier studies which
obtained predicted subliminal effects (e.g., Silverman,
1965) .

For both exposures in ascending series and at
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durations used in the experiments proper, the aggressive
stimuli were never judged to be significantly more angular
than the neutral stimuli.

In three comparisons, neutral

stimuli were judged more angular, contrary to Guthrie and
Wiener's (1966) findings.

Silverman and Spiro also note

several studies (e.g., Spence & Holland, 1962; Fiss, Goldberger, & Klein, 1963; Silverman & Silverman, 1964) that
employed a "discrimination task" in response to the partial-cue criticisms of Eriksen (1960) and others.

In this

task, experimental and control stimuli are presented randomly under the same tachistoscopic conditions as they were
in the experiment proper and the subject's task is to tell
them apart (without having to identify them).

If stimuli

are yielding different partial cues, a better than chance
discrimination presumably should be made.
cant subliminal effects were obtained in

Though signifit~ese

studies,

almost no subjects were able to make this discrimination.
Silverman and Spiro report that the subjects who could make
the discrimination tended to show less subliminal effect
than the majority who could not.

Additionally, they cite a

study by Spence and Holland (1962) which suggested

~~at

the

availability of partial-cues significantly interfered with
subliminal effects.
In a somewhat philosophical rejoinder, Hiener and
Kleespies (1968) argue that one can never "prove" that some
supraliminal cues are not available.

Their position states
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that some cues are available, not necessarily angularity,
which could account for observed effects.

Finally, Silver-

man (1968) replies by claiming that part-cue adherents need
to demonstrate structural differences between pairs of
neutral and critical stimuli and also that these differences are likely to emerge during the experiment proper
(e.g., by a "discrimination task").

Clearly, part-cue

theory has difficulty explaining how subjects can react
differently to supraliminal cues of two stimuli when they
are unable to tell whether the stimuli are the same or different.
The final criticism of the subliminal perception
paradigm to be considered is that it implies some sort of
"pre-perceiver" or "little-man-inside-the-head" that perceives and reacts to stimuli before
experienced.

~~ey

are consciously

This debate appears to stem from different

orientations toward psychology and semantic biases.

For

example, Eriksen's (1960) implication of a "superdiscriminating unconscious" seems to imply more of a homunculus
than does Dixon's (1971), p. 90) "antecedent physiological
processes which do not have phenomenal representation."
Erdelyi (1974) suggests that this problem is ameliorated if
t~e

phenomenon is understood in information-processing

terms.

He argues:

that a system with control processes for internal
regulation, including regulation of input, violates
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no sacrosanct edict of science, nor does it imply the
literal existence of little men or demons in the head
(1974, p. 4).
Acceptance of these sorts of internal control processes does not necessarily imply acceptance of subliminal
perception.

Neisser (1967) argues that the pre-attentive

processes implicated by this view are cruder and less accurate than focal ones and so could not be expected to
operate at an input level below that for attentive (i.e.,
conscious) processes.

For the same reason, they could not

be expected to recognize and react to the meaning of stimuli prior to conscious recognition.

The results of some

subliminal studies (particularly those of Silverman) certainly do implicate some very complex and acqurate processes occurring at below conscious levels.

To account for

these results, Dixon (1971) offers an information-processing model involving multiple inputs giving rise to preconscious parallel processing.

Following a microgenetic

view of perception (Werner, 1948), he posits a stage in
perceptual processing where meaning is extracted while
naming is impossible.

As additional evidence of this

stage, he offers observations of aphasics who clearly
recognize but cannot name objects.

He suggests that im-

poverished stimulation, as well as cortical damage, may
operate to stop perceptual processing at this preconscious
level.
In conclusion, the debate over subliminal percep-
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tion has ranged across many psychological viewpoints for
more than two decades.

Perhaps the primary reason for the

abundance of debate is the frequency of poorly controlled
studies which show weak or ambiguous subliminal effects.
This is complicated by the apparently small range of stirnulus values between which the phenomenon is demonstrable
(Hilgard, 1962).

Secondly, the idea of subliminal percep-

tion has often appeared to contradict common sense notions
of perception (e.g., "If I cannot see it, I cannot react to
it.") and many epistemological assumptions about perception
and behavior (e.g., Wiener & Kleespies'
perception" position).

[1968] "realism in

Nonetheless, the paradigm has

gained increasing acceptance as theoretical viewpoints have
changed (Dixon, 1971) and the part-processes hypothetically
underlying the phenomenon are better understood (e.g.,
Moray, 1970).

How several of the criticisms mentioned

above apply to the research program of Silverman and associates are examined in the following section.
Silverman's Research on "Subliminal
Psychodynamic Activation"
tvi thin the context of attempts to clarify and validate some aspects fo psychoanalytic theory, Silve.rman and
his collaborators at New York University have published
over 25 studies (summarized in Silverman, 1976) using a
laboratory technique termed "subliminal psychodynamic
activation."

The theory behind this technique derives from
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Freud's model of unconscious conflict and defense as they
relate to psychopathological symptomatology.

Following

Klein and Holt's (1960) emphasis on the importance of the
drive-relevance of subliminal stimuli, Silverman (1976)
assumes that a stimulus containing wish-related content
makes contact with derivatives of the related wish if the
wish is currently active in the person.

Thus, the sublimi-

nal input produces an effect analogous to that of an internally generated increase in intensity of an unconscious
wish.

In line with Pine's (1964} notion of indirect sub-

liminal effects and the theory of psychodynamic defenses,
Silverman argues that the ideas and images activated by
this input are likely to be transformed so that their wishrelated character is obscured.

They are thus not expected

to come directly into awareness but rather to press for
expression without the person's awareness.

For Silverman,

this is evidenced by increases or decreases in the psychopathological symptoms related to the unconscious wish, the
direction depending on whether the stimulus has conflictintensifying or conflict-alleviating connotations. Appendix
D addresses ethical concerns relevant to this research.)
The idea of activation of an unconscious wish or
conflict suggests that the present paradigm is closely related to the more comprehensive "schema activation" model
proposed by Klein and Holt (1960).

As noted earlier,

Klein's (1970) programmatic research interest was to ex-
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plore the interactions between peripheral and focal trains
of thought.

His work was directed towards understanding

the cognitive and perceptual processes involved and specifying the conditions under which an incidental input effects behavior and conscious experience.

In contrast,

Silverman (1977) appears to accept implicitly a model of
how subliminal input can affect behavior and goes on to use
the technique to test specific hypotheses about psychopathology.

His goal has been to validate and clarify psy-

choanalytic propositions relating particular symptoms
(e.g., depression) to particular unconscious conflicts
(e.g., aggression turned towards the self).

Before looking

at the results of this research, the experimental method is
reviewed.
Essentially, the effect on psychopathological behavior of subliminal presentation of wish-related stimuli
is compared to that of subliminal presentation of (rela-

tively) neutral stimuli.

Sessions typically begin with a

"baseline" assessment of subjects' propensity for whatever
behavior is being studied.

This is followed by 4-msec

tachistoscopic exposures to conflict-related or neutral
stimuli.

Both pictorial and verbal stimuli are shown four

times for each condition and both experimenter and subject
are blind to stimulus content.

A re-assessment of patho-

logical behavior follows the tachistoscopic presentations.
This procedure is repeated for other neutral and critical
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stimuli in the same session or the next day.

Silverman

(1976) reports predicted results on a variety of behaviors,
including thought process, feeling state, speech disorder,
non-verbal behavior, and sexual attraction.
The bulk of the earlier studies in this program
were directed towards investigating the role of aggressive
wishes and merging fantasies in schizophrenic symptomatology (summarized in Silverman, 1975) .

A variety of aggres-

sive and neutral stimuli were used, e.g., a lion charging
versus a bird flying, man holding a dagger versus a man
reading a newspaper, and the verbal stimuli CANNIBAL EATS
PERSON versus PEOPLE ARE WALKING.

Generally, the aggres-

sive stimuli led to increased pathological behavior measured by Rorschach content, TAT stories, word associations,
and a six-point scale measuring "non-verbal pathological
behavior" (e.g., inappropriate laughter).

Later studies

suggested that the effect \vas a delayed one (Silverman,
1971) and that it was more reliably obtained with long-term
rather than short-term schizophrenic patients (Silverman &
Candell, 1970).
Other studies (e.g. , Si 1verman, Spiro, 'Neisberg,

&

Candell, 1969) report that subliminal presentation of the
message MOMMY AND I ARE ONE (a "symbiotic-gratification
fantasy") led to a decrease in pathological behavior among
differentiated but not undifferentiated schizophrenics.
Silverman (1977) reports unpublished findings (Kaplan,
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1976; Kaye, 1975) suggesting these ameliorative effects are
specific to this message as several closely related messages (e.g., MOMMY IS ALWAYS WITH ME) had no effect on
pathological behavior.

These results are interpreted to

support the hypotheses that symbiotic fantasy gratification
reduces pathology in schizophrenics while activation of
aggressive fantasy intensifies pathological manifestations.
Further studies have investigated psychoanalytic
hypotheses relating specific stimulus content to depression, homosexuality, stuttering, and competition.

Rutstein

and Goldberger (1973) found that presentation of aggressive
stimuli led to significantly higher self-ratings of depression but to no change in Rorschach measures of "aggression
directed inward" among non-psychotic depressed patients.
Supporting the psychoanalytic hypothesis that homosexuality
involves (in part) a flight from incest, Silverman, Kwawer,
Wolitzky, and Caron (1973) found that stimuli containing
incestuous themes produced an increase in homosexual and a
decrease in heterosexual feelings reported by a group of
homosexual males.

In another study (Silverman, Klinger,

Lustbader, Farrel, & Martin, 1972), stuttering was found to
increase after subliminal presentations of anal content as
compared to neutral content.

Finally, Silverman, Ross,

Adler, and Lustig (1978) found competitive behavior (dart
throwing) was effected by oedipally-related stimuli that
either sanctioned or condemned the idea of defeating father.
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For Silverman (1976, 1977), these results support particular psychoanalytic notions relating forms of pathology to
specific unconscious wishes and conflicts.
Noting that many of these results could be explained by the generally negative affective quality of the
various stimuli rather than their specific meaningful content, Silverman, Bronstein, and Mendelsohn (1976) tested
new groups of stutterers, homosexuals, depressives, and
schizophrenics.

Each subject was subliminally exposed to

three sets of stimuli:

(a) the "relevant" wish-related

stimulus (aggressive for the schizophrenics and depressives,
incest for ·the homosexuals, and anal for the stutterers);
(b) an "irrelevant" wish-related stimulus, but one that intensified the symptoms of one of the other groups (incest
for schizophrenics and stutterers, aggressive for the homosexuals, and anal for the depressives); and (c) a neutralcontrol stimulus.

Three of the four groups showed signifi-

cant increases in pathology after exposure to their "relevant" wish-related stimulus (depressives showed mixed results).

In no instance did the "irrelevant" stimulus in-

fluence the symptom under consideration.

These results

were interpreted as support for the psychoanalytic position that symptoms have specific meanings and express an
individual's struggle with a particular conflictual wish.
In other recent studies, subliminal presentations
of the HOr-1l1Y AND I ARE ONE stimulus have been shown to
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enhance the effect of various therapeutic modalities with
overweight women (Silverman, Martin, Ungaro, & Mendelsohn,
1978) and with insect phobics (Silverman, Frank, &
Dachinger, 1974).

Silverman (Note 2) reports unpublished

findings (Parker, in preparation) that repeated exposures
to this stimulus as compared to a neutral one resulted in
higher exam scores for a group of college students.

In

perhaps his most provocative work to date, Silverman
(1978a, Note 2) uses these results and those obtained with
oedipally-related stimuli to advance a thesis regarding the
role of unconscious fantasy in psychotherapeutic success.
In particular, he posits that certain therapies (e.g.,
systematic desensitization, client-centered therapy, anq
meditation) are apt to activate symbiotic-gratification
fantasies in which the therapist is unconsciously perceived
as the good symbiotic mother.

Other therapies (e.g.,

Masters and Johnson type sex therapy, body contact therapies, assertiveness training, and encounter treatment) are
more likely to activate fantasies of sanctioned oedipal
gratification in which the therapist is unconsciously experienced as a permissive superego figure.

In light of his

research findings on the effects of subliminal activation
of these two fantasies, Silverman argues that their inadvertant activation may play a significant role in the
therapeutic success of many forms of therapy.
In sum, Silverman and his associates have put to-
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gether one of the most ambitious and voluminous research
programs on subliminal perception to date.

More than 25

studies have been published while an additional 30 studies
remain unpublished (Silverman, Note 3).

As noted above,

these findings may have far-reaching implications for
understanding therapeutic processes (Silverman, Note 2) and
for developing new therapeutic methods (e.g., Silverman,
Martin, Ungaro, & Mendelsohn, 1978) .

Purporting to vali-

date psychoanalytic hypotheses about symptom formation and
unconscious motivation, the program may approach the
"promise of a clinical-experimental psychology of unconscious phenomena" (Wolitzky & Wachtel, 1973, p. 840) hoped
for by earlier investigators.

Certainly, the experimental

results are not readily explained by many modern perceptual
and visual information-processing theories (e.g., Neisser,
1967) •

Given these implications and the claims made by the

researchers, the need for careful evaluation and independent replication is clearly indicated.

Some general criti-

cisms reflecting on the validity and reliability of the
overall research program are discussed next.

This is fol-

lowed by a description of a particular study and the results of a replication attempt.
Perusal of individual studies suggests that experimental results are rarely straightfon1ard and unambiguous.
This appears especially true for the hypotheses that have
been most extensively investigated.

For example, later
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studies using aggressive stimuli with schizophrenics obtained inconsistent results that were explained in terms of
a "delayed effect" (Silverman, 1971) and differences between long-term and short-term patients (Silverman &
Candell, 1970).

Greenberg (1977) also notes the lack of

consistency in effect across studies and complains that
Silverman shifted rather hastily from one measurement technique to another without exploring in detail or depth the
limits of the various measures of effect.

In a similar

vein, Shapiro (1978) notes that studies of symbiotic stimuli with schizophrenics have also obtained inconsistent
results in that significance tends to occur on one or
another measure but rarely on all measures used in a study.
Moreover, the effects appear on different measures from
study to study.

Shapiro argues that this raises some

questions as to the nature of the effects and what underlies them.

Silverman (1978b) replies to this criticism

claiming that the common effect in these studies was
greater adaptive functioning after stimulation and that the
fact that it is found on different measures at different
times raises questions for further research, but does not
challenge the basic thesis.

Silverman appears correct in

asserting that these inconsistent results raise further
research questions.

His labeling the common effect as

"greater adaptive functioning" ignores, however, the direct
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challenge to replicability and reliability posed by these
inconsistent results.
The reader also notes Silverman's tendency to invoke personality variables when accounting for inconsistent
or weak results (e.g., the "deniers" in Silverman, Bronstein, & Mendelsohn's [1976] sample of depressives).
Though these variables may well prove to be important and
so should be investigated, attention need also be paid to
specifying the range of stimulus conditions within which
subliminal effects are obtained. 2 Given other reviewers'
(e.g., Dixon, 1977) emphasis on the small range of stimulus
values for which subliminal effects occur, Silverman's lack
of careful consideration here is somewhat surprising.

For

example, except for very recent reports (e.g., Silverman,
Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978), this reviewer found

~

studies for which illumination levels were reported for
both the blank and stimulus fields.

Room illumination

levels and time given for subjects to adapt to tachistoscope lighting before subliminal exposures are also notably
lacking.

Finally, details on the construction, brightness,

and contrast of stimulus cards are usually absent.

Beside

prohibiting conclusions about the stimulus range of sub2
Given the present state of knowledge regarding
subliminal phenomena, it may be argued that it is most appropriate to first establish the stimulus parameters for
which subliminal perception is reliably demonstrable, and
then to investigate the contributions of personality and
other mediating variables.
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liminal effects, these oversights make exact replication
impossible.

In one attempted replication, Emmelkamp and

Straatman (i976) found that two of their twenty subjects
could exactly reproduce the experimental stimuli following
4-msec exposures.
Except for one footnote (Silverman & Spiro, 1976a,
p. 329) referring to an earlier study (Silverman, 1966) in
which no significant differences were found between 4-msec
and 6-msec stimulus exposures, this reviewer found neither
empirical evidence nor rationale regarding the choice of
4-msec exposure speeds, durations between exposures (usually 3 seconds) or number of exposures (usually 4) .

Again,

attention to and systematic variation of these variables
could significantly contribute to understanding what stimulus values underlie subliminal effects.

Similarly, care-

ful threshold determination procedures are rarely reported

in the studies.

Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978)

do report threshold data obtained with one of the two tachistoscopes used in their study, but fail to specify the
procedures used to collect the data.

As Eriksen (1960) and

others have noted, differing methods may obtain quite different threshold estimates.

Thus, Silverman's data give

little indication of how far below awareness the reported
phenomena are demonstrable.
Many of the criticisms and the results of EITmelkamp
and Straatman (1976) mentioned above raise a question re-
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garding the possibility that partial cues were available to
subjects in some studies.

Silverman and Spiro (1967a) and

Silverman (1968) offer data and persuasive arguments
against this possibility for (at least) many of their
studies.

Particularly impressive is their report that sub-

jects were unable to discriminate between (without having
to identify) neutral and critical stimuli when presented
under the conditions used in several experiments.

Un-

fortunately, the discrimination task has not been administered to subjects in all studies (e.g., Silverman, Frank,
& Dachinger, 1974).

Silverman (1976) marshalls further

support against the partial-cue hypothesis from several
studies in which stimuli were presented at both 4-msec and
10 second durations (e.g., Rutstein & Goldberger, 1973).
In none of the seven studies mentioned did supraliminal exposures lead to significant changes in measured pathology
while all obtained predicted subliminal effects.

Though

supportive of the subliminal hypothesis, findings that subjects react differently to completely available stimuli (or
to different amounts of part-cue availability) cannot disprove the partial cue hypothesis (1/liener
1968).

&

Klees pies,

As an overstated example, one can easily imagine

that subjects' reactions to the part-cue "HI" might differ
considerably from those to the complete word "SHIT."
As some of the foregoing criticisms are applicable
to most or all of the studies considered, the strength and
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reliability of the overall findings is called into question.

These methodological flaws also create doubt as to

whether the experiments are valid tests of the psychoanalytic hypotheses they are purported to test.

In this

regard, investigations testing the specificity of relationships between symptoms and stimulus content (Silverman,
Bronstein, & Mendelsohn, 1976) and those comparing the
effects of semantically related stimulus contents (reported
in Silverman, 1977) are most provocative in their support
for psychoanalytic hypotheses relative to other hypotheses.
Given these questions about the reliability of the
overall findings and the validity of the "subliminal psychodynamic activation" construct hypothesized to underlie
the results, the need for independent replication of any
part of this research program is clearly apparent.
man (Note 3} lists nineteen studies completed
sponsorship.

\V'i

Silver-

thout his

Only three of these have been published.

Rutstein and Goldberger's (1973) study of depressives was
completed while Rutstein was a graduate student at New York
Univer~ity

and obtained inconsistent results.

articles (Greenberg, 1976;

The other

Emmelkamp & Straatman, 1976)

appear in journals published outside the United States and
essentially fail to replicate Silverman's findings.

Green-

berg (1976) compared the effects of aggressive ana neutral
stimuli with schizophrenics.

His only significant finding

was an increase in a Rorschach measure of pathological
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thinking following exposure of the neutral stimulus, opposite Silverman's findings.

Emmelkamp and Straatman

(1976) found no subliminal effect \'lith a symbiotic gratification stimulus on snake phobics in an attempted replication of Silverman, Frank, and Dachinger (1974).

Un-

fortunately, all of these replication attempts suffer from
many of the same methodological shortcomings discussed with
regard to the original studies.
Subliminal Perception Studies with
Oedipally-Related Stimuli
In an effort to encourage replication and to demonstrate subliminal effects on a type of behavior not previously studied, Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978)
report results of four experiments using a relatively simple behavioral measure and college males as subjects.

The

major intention of each experiment was to manipulate,
through subliminal presentation of conflict-related rnaterial, the degree of oedipal conflict in the subjects and
to observe the effects of this on subjects' accuracy in
dart-throwing competition.

Stimuli were chosen either to

intensify oedipal conflict by condemning the idea of defeating father in competition or to alleviate the conflict
by sanctioning this idea.

The verbal message BEATING DAD

IS OK was presented for the sanctioning condition, and
BEATING DAD IS HRONG was used for the condemning situation.
Each message was presented following congruous pictures of
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an older and younger man both smiling (sanctioning) or both
frowning (condemning).

Thus, the study purports to test

the psychoanalytic proposition that males can unconsciously
inhibit themselves in competitive performance because win-

ning has the hidden connotation of defeating father for
mother's love (Beisser, 1961).
In three of the four experiments, the results obtained were consistent with the expectation that exposure
to the OK stimuli would enhance subsequent·dart-throwing
accuracy while the WRONG stimuli would diminish it.

The

authors note that for these three groups, 40 of 78 subjects
(51 percent) obtained adjusted scores for the OK condition
that were 100 points greater than their adjusted scores for
the WRONG condition.

In contrast, only one subject had a

difference of this magnitude in the opposite direction.
For the experiment which failed to obtain significant results, uncontrolled illumination levels were blamed.

A

subsequent experiment varied illumination levels and found
that stimuli exposed at higher levels failed to produce
effects even though stimuli were then closer to threshold.
Results from a discrimination task administered to most
subjects following three of the experiments suggest that
results cannot be attributed to the availability of supraliminal partial cues. 3
3·unfortunately, the discrimination task was not
administered following Experiment I which used a three-
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Silverman and Fishel (Note 4) review research on
the oedipus complex.

They argue that subliminal psycho-

dynamic activation is a way to experimentally stimulate
oedipal motives without disturbing their status as unconscious mental contents.

In their paper, they report two

unpublished successful replications of the dart study mentioned above.4

They cite Lonski and Palumbo (1978) who

found predicted results for the two BEATING DAD stimuli and
no effect for stimuli in which the word MOM replaced DAD.
Silverman and Fishel (Note 4) also report the results of
Hayden and Silverstein (1978) who obtained predicted effects for the two BEATING DAD stimuli and for WINNING MOM
IS OK and WINNING MOM IS WRONG.

The stimuli WINNING DAD IS

OK and NINNING DAD IS WRONG had no effect on dart scores.
The results of these replication studies are interpreted by
Silverman and Fishel as evidence that the specifically
oedipal content of the stimuli was responsible for the
observed changes in competitive performance.
Results obtained in a further replication attempt
(Swanson, Note 1) are in striking contrast to those reported above.

Additional information on procedure and

copies of the stimuli used in the original study were
field tachistoscope most similar to that used in the
present study.
4The present author was unable to acquire the
original reports of these two studies.

50
obtained from Silverman.

Two experimenters used identical

procedures with a total of 38 subjects. 5

Means and stan-

dard deviations for dart scores obtained following the two
BEATING DAD stimuli and their associated baseline stimuli
are presented in Table 1.

The results of matched-pairs t

tests computed for these data are presented in Table 2.
These reveal that the only statistically significant result
obtained was for the author's subjects following exposures

(£

to the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus

< .01, 2-tailed).

Dart scores increased significantly here, a finding directly opposite that of the original study.

Fourteen sub-

jects showed increases in dart scores following this stimulus while only four showed decreases

£ < .OS).

<x 2 (1)

= 4.55,

The co-experimenter obtained no effect with the

same stimulus.

When results from both experimenters are

combined, neither of the oedipally-related stimuli had a
significant effect on dart scores.

These results clearly

fail to support Silverman's findings on the effects of subliminal stimulation with these stimuli, and in one

instanc~

are in the opposite direction of his original findings.
In the same study, Swanson (Note 1) presented additional stimuli designed to investigate which elements of
the OK and WRONG stimuli are necessary to produce the
experimental effects.

To test whether the specifically

5Thanks are due to Robert Casas who was the coexperimenter in this investigation.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Critical and Baseline
Dart Scores for Swanson (Note 1)
Author
Stimulus

(~=18)

Co-Experimenter
(~=20)

Combined
(n=38)

BEATING DAD IS OK
Baseline
445.55

461.00

453.68

89.19

88.67

88.05

M

437.22

468.50

453.68

so

102.83

108.35

105.53

M

419.45

458.00

439.74

SD

120.71

128.42

124.67

465.00

451.00

457.63

92 .. 94

130.34

112.88

M
SD
·critical

BEATING DAD IS WRONG
Baseline

Critical
M

SD
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Table 2
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for Swanson (Note 1)

Stimulus

Author
<n.=l8)

Co-Experimenter
(!!_=20)

Combined
(!!_=38)

BEATING DAD IS OK
Mean difference

-8.33

7.50

.00

102.97

64.72

84.18

.34

0.52

.00

!-lean difference

45.55

-7.00

17.89

so

65.64

80.20

77.40

-.39

1.43

so

of difference

-

t
BEATING DAD IS WRONG

of difference

t
*£ < .01, 2-tailed

2.94*
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oedipal elements of the original stimuli are necessary,
reference to defeating father was eliminated from a further
set of stimuli (WINNING DARTS IS OK and WINNING DARTS IS
WRONG with congruous pictures).

A further set eliminated

reference to competition and included only a non-specific
behavioral injunction (YOU DO OK and YOU DO WRONG with congruous pictures) •

In the event, none of these four criti-

cal stimuli had a significant effect on dart scores, although the WINNING DARTS IS OK stimulus approached significance (P < .10, 2-tailed).

Again, the direction here was

surprising in that this stimulus led to decreases in dart
scores.
This study clearly failed to replicate any part of
Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig's (1978) demonstration
of "subliminal psychodynamic activation" with the dartthrowing paradigm.

This was true for both oedipally-

related stimuli and for two experimenters running separate
groups of subjects.

Though slight differences between

studies can never be completely eliminated, Swanson (Note
1) found no obvious or straightforward reasons explaining
the radically different results obtained.

He concludes

that the predicted effect is not "reliable and powerful" as
described by the original authors (p. 354).

Rather, it is

more probable that the original findings were dependent on
highly specific and unknown situational, subject, or experimenter variables.

The apparent fragility and inconsis-
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tencies found in subliminal perception results highlight
the need for careful independent replication.
The Present Study
The present investigation includes a further replication of this study using the two BEATING DAD stimuli in
the dart paradigm.

An additional control group receives

identical treatment except that the "priming" procedures
used in the earlier studies are omitted.

The results bear

on Silverman's (1965) assertion regarding the necessity of
these procedures for normal subjects and on the more general issue of the role of drive activation in subliminal
perception research (e.g., Klein & Holt, 1960).

Addi-

tional personality and historical data are collected in
order to evaluate more systematically the importance of
subject differences for this paradigm.

In particular, sub-

jects are asked about their religious history, as this may
in part determine personal meanings given to the words
"ok," "wrong," and "dad."

Subjects are also asked the

words used as children and at present to refer to their
fathers.

Primary meanings associated with several stimulus

words are also elicited.

These data may shed light on the

relevance of idiosyncratic and associative meanings given
to stimulus words.

Finally, subjects complete the Califor-

nia Personality Inventory in an open-ended exploration of
identifiable personality differences associated with
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subliminal effect in the dart paradigm.
Studies of subliminal perception have often yielded
weak or ambiguous results and have only rarely been replicated.

One possible reason for the apparent fragility of

subliminal effects is that the stimulus contents used in
many experiments may be insufficient in their emotional impact and so have negligible effect on primary process or
non-conscious mental events.

In addition, many studies

have been criticized for employing dependent measures insensitive to the subtle effects of subliminal stimulation
on peripheral trains of thought (Klein, 1967) .

The second

part of the present investigation addresses itself to these
.criticisms by including stimuli with highly aggressive content and employing word association tasks as dependent
measures.
For the word association paradigm, subliminally
presented stimuli include the verbal message DESTROY FATHER
with associated picture of a younger male attacking an
older male figure.

The (relatively) neutral message PEOPLE

WALKING with picture of these figures in a peaceful pose is
also employed.

Following exposures to one of these stim-

ulus pairs, subjects associate to their own responses in a
chaining fashion or respond to a list of 12 stern words read
by the experimenter.

Following Silverman's (1976) theoreti-

cal constructs, it is hypothesized that the highly agressive stimuli will arouse unconscious conflict reflected by
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disturbances in subjects' associative processes.
Dependent measures include assessment of the
quality of relatedness of r·esponse to stem words (Moran,
1953) •

The prediction here is that associations following

DESTROY FATHER exposures will receive lower relatedness
scores than those subsequent to exposures of the neutral
stimulus pair.

Similarly, commonality scores (relative

frequency of a response in a normative population) of associations given following aggressive stimulation are predicted to be lower than those following neutral stimulation.

Atypical responses (with lower commonality scores)

are understood here to reflect underlying associative disturbance (Rapaport, Gill & Shafer, 1945/1968).

Finally,

associations following the two subliminal stimuli are compared for the structural relationship of response to stem
word.

Moran, Mefferd, and Kimble's (1964) idiodynamic set

categories are employed here.
In both the word association and dart procedures,
stimulus order is randomized and the experimenter blind to
stimulus content.

Each subject is also administered a dis-

crimination task using experimental stimuli as a check on
the availability of supraliminal partial cues.

CHAPTER III
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects for the experiment were 34 males from the
Loyola University Department of Psychology undergraduate
volunteer pool.

Only subjects who spent their childhoods

in primarily English speaking homes were included (Silverman, Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978, p. 346).

Subjects who

wear {untinted) glasses or contact lenses for any reason
were required to wear them during all tachistoscipic
presentations (Silverman, Note 3) .

Prior to the actual

experiment, an additional 10 subjects drawn from the same
population were used for a pilot study described below.
Subjects' ages ranged from 17 to 21 years with a mean age
of 18.6 years and a mode age of 18 years.

Except for a

control group of 10 subjects who did not receive "priming"
procedures, each subject participated in all phases of the
experiment.
Materials
The experimental verbal stimuli for the dart
paradigm include:
ING DAD IS OK.

(a) BEATING DAD IS WRONG, and (b) BEAT-

Each is printed in letters 1.3 em high and

occupies two lines on a white card.
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The pictorial stimuli
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are 4 x 7 em line drawings intended to be congruous with
the verbal messages.

Thus, for Stimulus a, the pictoral

accompaniment consists of a simple line drawing of older
and younger males figures looking at each other with lips
turned downward, clearly conveying negative feeling.

For

Stimulus b, the pictorial accompaniment is identical, except that the lips are turned up, so that the figures appear to be smiling at each other.

The baseline stimuli

consist of (relatively) neutral verbal messages and congruous pictures.
and (b) PEOPLE ARE

They include:
ST&~DING.

(a) PEOPLE ARE SITTING,

The stimuli do not appear to

differ with regard to angularity.

How these stimuli were

generated from photocopies of the stimuli used in the original Silverman study will be detailed after other
materials are discussed.
As in Experiment I of the original study and
Swanson (Note 1), the stimuli are viewed through an electronically controlled Scientific Prototype three-field
tachistoscope (Model N-1000).
1.3 meters.

The viewing distance is

The exposures of verbal message and picture

(each from different fields)

last 4 msec each.

For the

dart paradigm, the tachistoscope is set up so that when
the subject looks into the eyepiece, he sees the blank
field with red fixation dot, which goes off each time the
stimulus fields go on.

After the instructions "Ready,"

the picture field is exposed for 4 msec followed by the

59

blank field for 3 seconds followed by the verbal field for
4 msec followed again by the blank field.

Then, with 5

seconds of the blank field passing after each pair of exposures, this sequence is repeated three times, thus giving four pairs of exposures for each condition.
For the dart-throwing competition, an Americanstyle dart board identical to that used in the original
study was hung 96 inches from the throwing line with the
bottom 58 inches from the floor.

The dartboard (manu-

factured by General Sportscraft of Bergenfeld, New Jersey)
is 18 inches in diameter and divided into seven equal concentric circles with the following point allotments:
20, 30, 40,.60, 80, and 100.

10,

One defect should be noted.

Part of the bullseye (the 100 point area) seems to be made
of hard wood which the metal darts cannot penetrate.

Thus,

darts hitting this area and bouncing away from the board
were scored as 100 points.

The dart-throwing area is

situated immediately adjacent to subject's seat for viewing the tachistoscope (see Appendix A-I, "Room Diagram").
Tachistoscopic illumination levels varied across
the original Silverman experiments and were not reported
for Experiment I in which a three-field tachistoscope was
used.

Silverman (Note 3) recommends however that the il-

lumination of the stimulus fields be set at between 4 and
5 footlarnberts with blank field and room illumination two
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to three times brighter than this. 6

Stimulus field il-

luminations were set at 5.5 footlamberts, and the blank
field at 13.0 footlamberts. 7

Illumination measurements

were made using an EG & G Model 450 photometer with experimental stimulus cards inserted in the fields.

All

fields were set at "constant-on" positions while measurements were made. Silverman (Note 3) also notes that subjects' exposure to glare from room lighting may interfere
with subliminal registration.

For this reason, room

lighting was shielded from subjects' direct view thereby
eliminating the possibility that glare from the flourescent lighting could effect results.
measured at 13.5 footlamberts.

Room illumination was

This measurement was taken

of the wall which subjects faced when seated at the tachistoscope and when throwing darts (see Appendix A-I,
"Room Diagram").
Lack of the original stimuli used in the Silverman
study made their exact replication in terms of brightness,
sharpness, and contrast impossible.

Swanson (Note 1) care-

fully constructed stimuli from photocopies of original
6 Experiment II of the original Silverman study
reports stimulus field illuminations of 5 footlamberts
with the blank field at 9 footlamberts. Experiment IV
used stimulus fields at 5 footlamberts with the blank
field at 15 footlamberts.
Both experiments used a twofield tachistoscope and obtained the predicted effect.
7 Illumination levels varied no more than 5 percent
over several measurements made during the course of the
experiment.
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stimuli in an effort to replicate ascending threshold
parameters recommended by Silverman (Note 3).

Stimuli

used by Swanson (Note 1} had mean thresholds of 30.4 msec
for first report and 46.1 msec for correct reading which
closely approximated Silverman's recommendations (of 30
8
msec and 40 to 60 msec, respectively).
Field illurnination levels identical to those used in the experiment
proper were used in generating threshold data.

Subjects

were instructed to report everything they saw, whether a
flash, a line, a letter, or a change in brightness, and
to report all parts of the stimuli as they were seen.

For

each threshold determination, the subject was given 45
seconds exposure to the blank field (with fixation dot) ,
told "Ready," and then exposed to the stimulus for 4 msec.
Each stimulus exposure was followed by 4 seconds of the
blank field.

Stimulus exposure times were increased by 2

msec increments until the subject first reported a partial
I

cue (e.g., a line, a letter} and then in 1 msec increments
until a correct reading was made.
8 These sti~uli appeared dramatically lighter than
the ones originally obtained. Copies of two of these
lightened stimuli and a description of threshold data were
sent to Silverman. He replied that the stimuli appeared
no lighter than others he had used in two-field tachistoscope experiments. Further, he reminded the author
that no illumination measurements had been made in Experiment I of the original experiment which used a Scientific Prototype three-field tachistoscope comparable
to the one used here. This could clearly have accounted
for the observed differences.
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More recently, Silverman (Note 3) has recommended
use of somewhat darker stimuli with consequent lower
thresholds for correct reading.

In an effort to provide

some data relevant to the question of the relationship between threshold and subliminal effect, a brief pilot study
was completed.

Additional stimuli were generated by dark-

ening and evening lines on copies of the stimuli used in
the earlier studies.

Ascending threshold data for these

stimuli was collected in the manner described above for 10
experimental subjects and 10 pilot subjects drawn from the
same subject pool.

For these 20 subjects, mean threshold

for first report was 21.4 msec with a range of 8 to 38
msec.

Mean threshold for correct reading was 35.5 msec

with a range of 14 to 76 msec.
These stimuli were used with the 10 pilot subjects
in a replication of the dart paradigm procedures described
by Swanson (Note 1) .

Means and standard deviations for

these dart scores are presented in Table 3.

Results of

matched-pairs ! tests in Table 4 show a significant increase in dart scores following subliminal exposures to
the BEATING DAD IS OK stimuli (£

< .OS,

2-tailed).

In

view of these results, the decision was made to employ
these stimuli and ones of similar darkness in all of the
experimental procedures which follow.
for photocopies of the stimuli used.)

(See Appendix E
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Critical and
Baseline Dart Scores for Pilot Subjects
Stimulus

SD

BEATING DAD IS OK
Baseline

437.00

67.17

Critical

468.00

80.11

Baseline

438.00

99.20

Critical

482.00

76.13

BEATING DAD tS WRONG

Note.

N

= 10.
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Table 4
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for Dart Scores
for Pilot Subjects
Mean
Difference

Stimulus

SD of
Difference

BEATING DAD IS OK

31.00

43.06

BEATING DAD IS WRONG

44.00

108.03

Note.

*E

<

N

=

10.

.05, 2-tailed.

t

2.28*
1.29
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Procedure for the Dart Paradigm
A verbatim account of the experimenter's interaction with subjects is provided in Appendix A-II.

This

was adapted with only minor variations from the account
obtained from the original authors.

The major steps of

the procedure are described below.
When each subject arrived, he was asked by the experimenter to read an information sheet that explains the
rudiments of the experiment and assures confidentiality
(see Appendix A-III).
form.

He was then asked to sign a consent

If the form was signed, the subject was told of the

dart-throwing competition for which cash prizes of $12, $8,
and $5 would be awarded to the three highest scorers.
After a brief explanation of the tachistoscope, the subject
was given the "priming" material identical to that used in
the original Silverman study and in Swanson (Note 1).

This

consisted of a brief questionnaire (Appendix A-IV) involving questions about the subject's relationships with his
mother and father, Rorschach card IV (the "father" card),
TAT card

7Bt1

(a "father-son" scene), TAT card

6BM

"mother-son" scene), and a story recall task.
involved the subject looking at TAT card

6BM

(a

The later
while being

read a story (Appendix A-V) made up by the original
authors to contain prominent oedipal elements.

He then

recalled the story and told it back to the experimenter.
The purpose of these procedures was to "prime"

66
the subjects for the oedipal content to be subliminally
presented.

Silverman (1965) reports that for subliminal

effects to be obtained for normal subjects, the mental
content that the stimuli were intended to trigger had to
be activated by priming beforehand.

As a test of this

hypothesis for the dart paradigm, a "no-priming" control
group of 10 randomly chosen subjects received all experimental procedures except those just described.
After two sets of eight practice dart throws,9
each subject was put through the two conditions of the
dart paradigm.

Each condition consisted of tachisto-

scopic exposure to a baseline stimulus pair and a baseline assessment of dart-throwing (all eight darts were
thrown by the subject and then retrieved by the experimenter).

This was followed by the tachistoscopic presen-

tation of one of the two experimental oedipal stimuli already described and another eight dart throws.

This was

followed by the other condition, in which pretest and
posttest assessments of dart-throwing were again collected.
The sequence of baseline conditions remained fixed for all
subjects, while order of presentation of the critical
. 1'~ was rand om~ze
. d .10
st~mu
9To minimize the possibility of a practice effect
over trials, two sets of practice throws were included
rather than one set as in the earlier studies.
lOAll stimulus materials were coded prior to the
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Materials and Procedures for the Chained and
D~screte Word Assoc~at~on Paradigms
Following the replication procedures described
above, each subject received subliminal exposures to
either the PEOPLE WALKING or DESTROY FATHER stimuli and
was asked for a chain of eight word associations.

These

stimuli were constructed so as to match stimuli used in
the dart paradigm in terms of line darkness and width,
contrast, angularity, size, and clarity.ll The critical
stimuli consisted of the verbal message DESTROY FATHER and
a simple line drawing of a younger male figure with a
knife attacking an older male figure.

The (relatively)

neutral stimuli consists of the verbal message PEOPLE
WALKING and a line drawing of the same younger and older
male figures positioned next to each other.

(See Appendix

F for photocopies of the stimuli used.)
For the word association procedures, the tachistoscope was set up so that the red fixation dot was on
when the subject looked into the eyepiece and turned off
when stimulus exposures began.

The duration of stimulus

experiment and entered into the tachistoscope in such a
way that the experimenter remained blind to their content.
In the event the experimenter (or subject) became aware
of stimulus content, stimulus cards were re-ceded and data
for that subject were discarded.
llAscending threshold data discussed earlier revealed small non-significant differences between these
sets of stimuli in mean thresholds for first report and
for correct reading.
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field exposures remained at 4 msec.

To provide more

stimulus exposures, each pictorial and stimulus was exposed ten times separated by two seconds of the blank
field.

The red fixation dot re-appeared following the

last stimulus exposure and served as a visual cue for
subjects to give associations (see Dixon, 1968).
An attempt was made to encourage subjects to re-

lax and not inhibit their associations in any way.
Appendix A-II for a verbatim account.)

(See

Following sublim-

inal exposures, the red fixation dot re-appeared cueing
subjects to say whatever word came to mind.

This word

was repeated by the experimenter as a.stem for subject's
next association.

Eight chained associations were _col-

lected in this manner.

This procedure was repeated for

each subject following exposures to the other picturemessage stimulus pair.

Thus, each subject gave sets of

eight chained associations following exposures to both the
subliminal stimuli.

Order of stimulus presentation was

randomized.
To obtain discrete word association data, each
subject was subliminally exposed a second time to either
the PEOPLE WALKING or DESTROY FATHER stimuli.

Subjects

then gave associations to a list of 12 stem words read by
the experimenter.

To maximize the possible effect of the

oedipal/aggressive subliminal stimulation, the list of
stems contained a mixture of aggressively and oedipally-
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related and neutral words.

The stern words with their re-

spective sources for normative data used in analysis of
response commonality are presented in Table 5.

The list

was presented in backwards order to half the subjects to
insure against any effect of list order.
Discrimination Task, Debriefing and
Personality Measures
Following presentation of the final stimuli and
subsequent word associations, all subjects completed a
discrimination task patterned closely after that described
in the original Silverman study (p. l46) .

was given 10

Each subject

trials in which, under the same conditions

as existed during the experiment proper, he was asked to
distinguish the flickers made by one of the picture-message
units from those made by another.
for directions given to subjects.)

(See Appendix A-VI
The two BEATING DAD

stimuli were presented (in randomized order) to half the
subjects, while the DESTROY FATHER stimulus pair was presented with the PEOPLE WALKING pair to remaining subjects.

Each set was presented with the same number of ex-

posures and timing as in the experiment proper.
Next, subjects were told that a report of experimental results, prize money, and a description of the subliminal content would be mailed to them at the end of the
experiment.

They had been requested to leave mailing ad-

dresses on the questionnaire administered earlier.

If at
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Table 5
Stem Nords Used in Discrete

~"Yord

Association

Task With Source for Normative Data
Stem

Normative Data

1.

Wish

Jenkins {1970)

2.

House

Jenkins (1970)

3.

Father

Rapaport, Gill and Schafer
{1945/1968)

4.

Comfort

Jenkins {1970)

5.

Stab

Geen and Stenner {Note 5)

6.

Table

Jenkins (1970)

7.

Walking

Keppel and Strand (1970)

8.

Lose

Keppel and Strand (1970)

9.

Destroy

Geen and Stenner (Note 5)

10.

Street

Jenkins (1970)

11.

Guilt

a

12.

Star

Keppel and Strand (1970)

a As independent normative data could not be located,
norms were generated from the present data.
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this point, any subject insisted on knowing the content of
the stimuli, they were revealed and the subject asked to
keep this information secret.

Other questions about the

experiment were answered and subjects were then encouraged
to contact the experimenter by phone at any time with any
further concerns or questions.

Subjects were then asked

to complete a brief questionnaire (Appendix B-I) and the
California Personality Inventory (CPI).

A summary of

these procedures appears in Table 6.
Dependent Measures and Data Analysis
Each subject received four dart scores (two
critical and two baseline) based on the total of the eight
darts thrown following each stimulus exposure.

The effect

of the two BEATING DAD stimuli was assessed by subtracting
from each critical dart score the baseline dart score which
had immediately preceded it.

Matched-pairs t tests were

computed on the obtained (critical minus baseline) difference scores.

Silverman (personal communication) has raised

the possibility that the experimental effect obtained in
the original study may be of a rather short duration.

To

investigate this, matched-pairs t tests were computed for
the BEATING DAD stimuli using only the first four dart
throws that followed each baseline and critical stimulus
exposure.

In view of the hazards involved in predicting
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Table 6
Summary of Procedure
1.

Introduction and consent form

2.

Priming procedures (except for "no-priming" control

3.

subjects)
Sixteen practice dart throws

4.
5.

Baseline 1 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE SITTING)
Baseline 1 dart throws (eight throws for each condi-

7.
8.

tion)
Critical 1 stimulation (one of the BEATING DAD
stimuli)
Critical 1 dart throws
Baseline 2 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE STANDING)

9.

Baseline 2 dart throws

6.

10.

Critical 2 stimulation (remaining BEATING DAD
sti~uli)

11.
12.
13.

Critical 2 dart throws
Instructions for word association task
Stimulation with PEOPLE WALKING or DESTROY FATHER

14.

Chained association task 1

15.

Stimulation with stimuli viewed in Step 13

16.

Discrete association task

17.

Stimulation with remaining stimuli (PEOPLE WALKING

18.

or DESTROY FATHER)
Chained association task 2

19.

Discrimination task

20.
21.

Debriefing
Subject Questionnaire

22.

California Personality Inventory
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direction of subliminal effects, all tests of significance
were two-tailed.
Correlation coefficients were computed for CPI
scale raw scores with (critical minus baseline) difference
scores for each stimulus to investigate the relationship
of personality variables and responsiveness to the subliminal stimuli.

Finally, subject questionnaire data on re-

ligion and associations to stimulus words, and discrimination task performance were related to dart difference
scores.

A measure of overall "responsiveness" in the dart

paradigm used here was computed by adding the absolute
value of the difference scores obtained following BEATING
DAD stimulation.

High "responsiveness" scores indicate

large differences between critical and baseline dart
scores regardless of their direction.

The measure thus

provides an index of amount of effect for each subject.
Discrete associations given to the stems listed
in Table 5 were scored for commonality and idiodynamic set
(Moran, Mefferd, & Kimble, 1964).

Group comparisons were

indicated as half the subjects were subliminally exposed
to PEOPLE WALKING and half to DESTROY FATHER.

Commonality

scores consisted of the relative frequency (in percentage) which a subject's association had been given as a
response to that stem in a normative sample.

Norms for

word associations were selected (in so far as possible)
on the basis of correspondence to the current sample of
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undergraduate males.

Thus, the Jenkins (1970) norms were

based on a sample of 1,008 introductory psychology students.

Keppel and Strand (1970) used 186 introductory

psychology students.

Geen and Stenner (Note 5) report

norms based on a sample of 191 undergraduate males.
Finally, Rapaport, Gill, and Schafer (1945/1968) obtained
norms with a sample of 167 "normal college students."
Comparisons between groups of subjects who viewed the two
subliminal stimuli included t tests on mean commonality for
each stem and totalled over stems.

An analysis of variance

of commonality scores by subliminal stimulus, subject group,
and list order was also computed.
The idiodynamic set scoring system was developed
by Moran, Mefferd, and Kimble (1964) in a factor analytic
study of word associations given by normals and schizophrenics.

It has been used in further studies of cogni-

tive structure in schizophrenic groups (e.g., DeWolfe,
1971).

The system involves categorizing the structural

relationship of response word to stem word.
gories (with an example) include:

The cate-

(a) synonym (house-

horne), (b) contrast (lose-find), (c) superordinate (tablefurniture),

(d) subordinate (street-pavement), (e) logical

coordinate (table-chiar), (f) functional (stab-knife), and
(g) predication (house-big).

Detailed instructions for

scoring are presented in Appendix B-III.

Judges estab-

lished a level of 93 percent agreement on ratings of
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individual responses made without knowledge of the subliminal stimulus which had preceded associations.

The

Cohen (1960) coefficient of agreement for nominal scales
(K)

was .91 for interjudge agreement.

The frequencies of

associations in each set category were compared between
groups exposed to the different subliminal stimuli.
Each subject generated two sets of eight chained
word associations (one set following each of the PEOPLE
WALKING or DESTROY FATHER exposures) •

Responses were

scored using Moran's (1953) five-point scale of quality of
relatedness of response word to stem word.

This scale

purports to measure disturbance in associative processes
and was validated as a measure of severity of current
psychiatric symptoms (Mefferd, Moran, & Kimble, 1960;
DeWolfe, 1973).
Appendix B-II.

Detailed scoring criteria are given in
Examples of responses at each of the five

scoring levels follow:
4
3
2
1
0

light-dark
train-bus
world-sky
book-dog
no response, repetition of stem

Judges established a level of 90 percent agreement on
ratings of individual responses with a Cohen (1960) coefficient of agreement of .89.
Two relatedness scores (one per subliminal stimulus) were generated for each subject by summing scores
for the seven stem-response pairs in each set.

Matched-
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pairs t tests were computed for each subject's difference
score (PEOPLE WALKING score minus DESTROY FATHER score) .
Comparisons of the frequency of responses falling into
each of the scoring categories were also completed.

Fin-

ally, as an additional test of the possibility that subliminal effects are of short duration, matched-pairs t tests
were repeated using only the first three stem-response
pairs in each set of chained associations.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Results for the Dart Paradigm
Means and standard deviations for dart scores obtained following the two BEATING DAD stimuli and their associated baseline stimuli are presented in Table 7.

Re-

sults are presented separately for the experimental group
and the control group which did not receive "priming" procedures.

The results of the matched-pairs t tests com-

puted for these data are presented in Table 8.

These re-

veal that, of the four tests computed, the only significant
result was for the "no-priming" control group following
exposures to the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus
2-tailed).

(£

< .02,

Dart scores increased in this instance, a

finding opposite that of Silverman, Ross, Adler, and
Lustig (1978) •

Nine subjects showed increases in dart

scores here, while one showed a decrease (X 2 [1]
E < .05).

=

4.5,

Results from experimental subjects fail to

replicate either the findings of Swanson (Note 1) or of
the original Silverman study.
As noted earlier, Silverman has raised the possibility that the experimental effect may be of a rather
short duration following subliminal stimulation.
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Table 9
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Critical and
Baseline Dart Scores
Experimental
Stimulus

(_!! = 24)

Control
(_!! = 10)

BEATING DAD IS OK
Baseline
M

so

466.25

472.00

85.00

90.04

474.58

473.00

58.53

103.28

484.58

434.00

78.35

73.51

480.83

481.00

79.56

101.15

Critical
M

so
BEATING DAD IS WRONG
Baseline
M

so
Critical

so
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Table 8
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for Dart Scores

Stimulus

Experimental
(,!! = 24)

Control
(,!!

= 10)

BEATING DAD IS OK
Mean difference

8.33

1.00

85.04

90.61

0.48

0.03

Mean difference

-3.75

47.00

so of difference

90.35

48.09

t

-0.20

SO of difference
t

BEATING DAD IS WRONG

*£ < .02, 2-tailed.

3.09*
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations for Critical and Baseline
Dart Scores Using Only First Four Dart Throws
Following Each Stimulus Exposure
Experimental
Stimulus

Control

= 10)

(!,! = 24)

(!,!

222.50

228.00

43.96

41.31

250.42

237.00

40.16

62.73

255.83

208.00

55.94

31.90

238.33

222.00

55.92

62.68

BEATING DAD IS OK
Baseline
M

so
Critical
M

so
BEATING DAD IS WRONG
Baseline
M

so
Critical
M
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presents means and standard deviations computed using only
the first four dart throws in each condition.

Table 10

presents the four matched-pairs t tests computed for these
data.

The only significant result here is an increase in

dart scores for experimental subjects following the BEATING
DAD IS OK stimuli

(~

< .01, 2-tailed}.

This increase was

evidently not sustained over the entire set of eight dart
throws (Table 8}.

These results contrast with those of

Swanson (Note 1} who obtained no significant differences
with either stimulus from analysis of the first four dart
throws.

This isolated result thus offers rather slight

support for the hypotheses of a short-lived subliminal
effect in the dart paradigm.
In an attempt to investigate the relationship between personality variables and responsiveness to subliminal stimulation in the dart paradigm, Pearson correlation coefficients were computed between subjects' CPI
scale scores and (critical minus baseline} differences in
dart scores for each of the BEATING DAD stimuli.

These

are presented in Table 11 for the experimental subjects
and in Table 12 for the "no-priming" control subjects.
No significant correlations were obtained for experimental
subjects while for control subjects, difference scores
for the NRONG stimuli were negatively associated with CPI
scores on "Capacity for status" and "Sense of well-being"
(~

< ;OS}.

Of the 72 correlation coefficients computed
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Table 10
Matched-Pairs t Test Results Using Only First Four
Dart Throws Following Each Stimulus Exposure
Stimulus

Experimental
<!!=24)

Control
<!!=10)

BEATING DAD IS OK
Mean difference

27.92

9.00

SD of difference

46.44

56.85

t

2.95*

0.50

BEATING DAD IS WRONG
Mean difference

-17.50

14.00

so of difference

67.26

54.81

t

-1.27

.81

*£ < .01, 2-tailed.
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Table 11
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of CPI Scale Scores with
(Critical Minus Baseline) Difference Scores for the
BEATING DAD Stimuli for Experimental Subjects
OK Difference
Scale
Dominance
Capacity for status
Sociability
Social presence
Self-acceptance
Sense of well-being
Responsibility
Socialization
Self-control
Tolerance
Good impression
Communality
Achievement via conformance
Achievement via independence
Intellectual efficiency
Psychological-mindedness
Flexibility
Femininity

(!!_

= 24)

NRONG Difference
(!!_ = 24)

-.253

.110

-.128

-.037

-.023

.041

-.012

.042

-.336

.135

-.057
.041

-.022
.054

-.045

.077

.195

.019

.139

.108

.227

-.014

-.128

-.137

.063

.077

.108

.110

.237

.074

.079
.074

.077
.317

.018

-.056
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Table 12
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of CPI Scale Scores with
(Critical Minus Baseline) Difference Scores for the
BEATING DAD Stimuli for Control Subjects
OK Difference
Scale
Dominance
Capacity for status
Sociability
Social presence
Self-acceptance
Sense of well-being
Responsibility
Socialization
Self-control
Tolerance
Good impression
Communality
Achievement via conformance
Achievement via independence
Intellectual efficiency
Psychological-mindedness
Flexibility
Femininity

*E. < .05

<!l = 10)

.298
.030
-.471
-.470
-.258
-.353
-.040
-.031
-.236
-.352
-.195
.043
-.313
-.469
-.218
.229
-.547
-.295

WRONG Difference
<!l = 10)
-.392
-.578*
-.141
-.204
-.099
-.580*
-.474
-.476
-.312
-.349
-.427
-.314
-.375
.009
-.343
-.227
.257
.477
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here, only two attained statistical significance.

Thus,

these findings probably constitute a Type I statistical
error.

In any event, the CPI sheds little light on per-

sonality variables as possible mediators of direction and
extent of subliminal effect in the dart paradigm.
Data on subjects' religion and associations to stimulus words were related to a measure of overall "responsiveness" in the dart paradigm.

This measure was computed for

each subject by adding the absolute value of the difference
scores (critical minus baseline) obtained following each
BEATING DAD stimulation.

Experimental subjects describing

the religious preference of their family when they were young
children as Catholic

(£ = 16) were compared to those whose

preference was described as non-Catholic (£
ence in

"responsi~eness"

groups was found (t [22]

= 8).

Nodiffe~

to the dart paradigm between these

=

.26, ns.).

Comparison of sub-

jects describing their present religious preference as Catholic

(£

= 15) with non-Catholics (n

= 9)

also revealed no

difference (t [22] = .01, ns.) in "responsiveness."
Similar analyses were performed comparing subjects
who refer to their fathers as "dad" with those using some
other word.

As young children, subjects who used "dad" (n

12) did not differ in "responsiveness" from subjects
12) who employed another term (t [22]

= -.86,

ns.).

ing subjects according to present use of "dad" (£
some other word

(h

=

=

Divid-

= 18)

or

(£ = 6) also failed to reveal any differ-
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ence in "responsiveness" (t [22] = .17, ns.).
Subjects were also questioned about their first
thought or image upon seeing the word "beating."

Nineteen

of the 24 experimental subjects picked "strike or hit repeatedly" while only one chose "win in competition."

This

result suggests that the stimulus word "beating" connoted
aggressive rather than competitive activity for the present
group of subjects.

It is not known whether this finding is

unique to the current sample and so could have been associated with the lack of effort observed in the competitive
(dart) situation.

This possibility appears unlikely in

view of the following findings.

Subjects also were asked

to indicate the word that most clearly communicated "defeating someone in competition."

Five subjects chose "beating"

while nineteen chose some other word such as "defeating" or
"winning over."

Contrary to expectation, subjects who chose

"beating" obtained slightly lower "responsiveness" scores
compared to remaining subjects although this did not reach
statistical significance (t [22] = .83, ns.).

In addition,

answers to these two questions about word choice did not
significantly differ between the experimental group and the
"no-priming" control group which did show an effect with
the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimuli.

Thus, it appears that

for these subjects, conscious associations to these stimulus words are not systematically related to the amount of
subliminal effect in the dart paradigm.
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Finally, experimental subjects were divided in
terms of their performance on the discrimination task.
Subjects correct on from one to four of ten discriminations
(n

= 7)

and those correct on from six to nine

(~

= 7)

did

not differ in "responsiveness" scores (t [12] = -.01, ns.).
In summary, results for the expeimental group show
no effect on dart scores for either BEATING DAD stimulus.
For the "no-priming" control group, BEATING DAD IS WRONG led
to increased dart scores, a finding opposite that of Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978).

Analyses using the

first four dart throws in each set found only an increase

jn

dart scores for experimental subjects following BEATING DAD
IS OK.

Of 72 correlations of CPI scale scores with differ-

ence scores for the two stimuli, only bvo attained significance and so are viewed as spurious.

Subjects' answers to

inquiries about religious preference, word used to refer to
their fathers, and conscious associations to stimulus words
did not systematically relate to a measure of overall "responsiveness" in the dart paradigm.

Accuracy on a stimulus

discrimination task also appeared unrelated to this measure.
Results for the Discrete Word
Assoc~ation Paradigm
Word associations given to 12 sterns following subliminal exposures to the PEOPLE WALKING or DESTROY FATHER
stimuli were scored for commonality (percentage of time the
response was given in a normative sample) and for idiodynamic
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set (Moran, Mefferd, & Kimble, 1964).

Means, standard de-

viations, and t test results for commonality scores comparing experimental subjects who received the different subliminal messages are presented in Table 13.

These results

reveal no differences between groups for 11 of the 12 stem
words.

Only associations given to the stem "lose" differed

between groups.

Here, subjects exposed to the subliminal

message DESTROY FATHER obtained higher commonality scores
(more typical responses) than did subjects exposed to PEOPLE
WALKING.

This finding is opposite the predicted direction,

and in light of the 12 tests computed, may represent a Type
I error.

Summing commonality scores for all stems reveals

no significant differences between groups (t [22] = -1.00,
ns.).

An

additional analysis was performed using a fre-

quency count of associations given by more than 10 percent
of the normative sample.

This also failed to reveal any

difference between groups exposed to the different subliminal messages (t [22] =-.59, ns.).
Table 14 presents means, standard deviations, and t
test results on commonality scores for the 10 "no-priming"
control subjects. 12 Here, only the stem word "walking" revealed a significant difference in commonality between subject groups.

More common associations were given here by

12 unequal group sizes resulted here from a blind
receding of the stimulus cards while control subjects were
being run.
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Table 13
Means, Standard Deviations, and t Test Results for Commonality Scores Obtained by Experimental Subjects

Stem Word
Wish
M
so
House
M
so
Father
M

so
Comfort
M
so
Stab
M

so
Table
M
so
Walking
M

so
Lose
M

so
Destroy
M
so
street
M

so
Guilt
M

so
star
M

so
Total
M

so
*E. < .02

PEOPLE WALKING
(!!,=12)

DESTROY FATHER
(!!,=12)

4.42
4.81

4.83
5.06

3.67
6.83

9.17
11.70

-1.41

36.58
36.99

54.33
31.96

-1.26

1.92
3.18

2.58
3.03

15.58
20.26

4.33
2.54

43.08
42.75

56.67
40.38

8.50
7.76

5.92
6.99

5.58
4.98

12.25
7.42

4.17
7.40

1.17
.58

1.40

4.50
4.17

7.42
6.26

-1.34

3.75
2.60

5.00
2.66

-1.16

2.92
4.08

3.50
4.58

-

134.67
88.66

167.17
69.83

t

-

-

.21

.53

1.91

-

.80
.86

-2.58*

.33

-1.00
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Table 14
l-1eans, Standard Deviations, and t Test Results for Commonality Scores Obtained by Control Subjects
PEOPLE WALKING
Stem Word

<!!=4)

DESTROY FATHER
(!!=6)

ta

Wish
M

so
House
M

so
Father
M

so
Comfort
M

SD
Stab
M

so
Tahle
M

so
Walking
M

SD
Lose
M

so
DeStroy
M

so
street
M

SD
Guilt
M

so
Star
M

so
Total
M

so

8.75
5.25

7.33
5.43

.41

7.25
11.84

5.33
9.65

.27

54.50
35.00

48.50
36.41

.26

8.25
4.92

1.00
.00

2.94

14.50
23.10

10.67
18.94

.28

22.50
41.02

29.33
42.36

-.25

17.00
.00

3.67
3.39

9.96*

16.00
5.77

9.67
7.12

1.55

1.00
.00

1.50
1.23

-1.00

6.25
5.50

5.33
5.24

.26

5.25
4.50

6.00
3.29

-.29

1.00
.00

7.33
6.59

-2.35

162.25
40.78

135.67
74.35

.73

aspss t test for separate variance estimates used in
view of unequal sample sizes.
*E.< .01
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subjects viewing the PEOPLE WALKING stimuli.

In view of

the small number of observations involved in computing this
statistic, lack of variation for one group's scores, and
the 11

~-significant

spurious.

findings, this result is viewed as

Summing commonality scores for all stems again

reveals no difference between the groups (t [8]

=

.64, ns.).

Finally, use of frequency counts of associations given by
greater than 10 percent of the normative sample also failed
to reveal any difference between these groups exposed to
different subliminal messages (t [8]

=

1.14, ns.).

Results of a 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of commonality scores for both experimental and control groups are
presented in Table 15.

It is clear that no main effects or

interactions approach significance.

The strikingly low F

values indicate most of the variance lies within rather than
between groups. Computation of eta 2 shows that only 16 percent of the total variance can be explained by the variables
and their interactions.

Clearly, these analyses indicate

that exposures to the two subliminal stimuli had no differential effect on the commonality of subsequent word associations, regardless of subject group or order list was presented.
Results of the idiodynamic set analysis for experimental subjects are presented in Table 16.

Binomial test

results indicate subjects subliminally exposed to DESTROY
FATHER gave significantly more Contrast responses and fewer
Predication responses than subjects exposed to PEOPLE
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Table 15
Analysis of Variance of Commonality Scores as a Function
of Subject Group, Subliminal Stimulus, and List Order
Source

df

MS

F

Group (G)

1

236.89

.04

Stimulus (S)

1

1,145.79

.20

Order (O)

1

1,832.60

.31

G X S

1

4,048.76

.69

G X 0

1

3,755.27

.64

S X 0

1

13,313.20

2.28

G X S X 0

1

1,136.90

.19

Explained

7

4,121.39

.70

26

5,848.41

Error (within)
Note.

Group refers to experimental or "no priming"

control group; stimulus refers to PEOPLE WALKING or
DESTROY FATHER; order refers to list of stem words presented forwards or backwards.
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Table 16
Frequencies and Binomial Test Results for Idiodynamic
Sets for Experimental Subjects

Set
Synonym

PEOPLE
WALKING
(£=12)

DESTROY
FATHER
(£=12)

Binomial
Test

ns.

4

9

16

31

9

9

ns.

Subordinate

10

6

ns.

Logical coordinate

30

33

ns.

Functional

26

19

ns.

Predication

10

2

Unscorable

39

35

Contrast
Superordinate

E. < .OS

E. < .05
ns.
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WALKING.

Overall comparison of the distributions of as-

sociations given subsequent to the two subliminal stimuli
is difficult as the data do not meet the assumption of
independent categories necessary for most statistical
techniques.

One would nonetheless expect the distribu-

tions to have little correlation with each other if the
associations were differentially distributed.

Computation

of a Spearman rank correlation comparing the two distributions results in a coefficient of .77.

Though no prob-

ability statement may be advanced, this can be compared to
the value of .74 that would be needed for statistical significance at the .OS level.

The high coefficient obtained

thus suggests that the two subliminal stimuli had negligible differential effect on the overall distributions of
subsequent associations for control subjects.
Idiodynamic set results for control subjects are
presented in Table 17.

They show no significant differ-

ences between the subliminal stimulus groups for any of
the eight categories.

As above, computation of a Spearman

rank correlation results in a coefficient of .90.

This

high coefficient again suggests the two subliminal stimuli
had negligible effect on the overall distributions of associations for these subjects.
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Table 17
Frequencies and Binomial Test Results for Idiodynamic
Sets for Control Subjects
PEOPLE
WALKING
Set

(!!_=4)

DESTROY
FATHER
(!!_=6)

Binomial
Test

Synonym

4

6

ns.

Contrast

9

16

ns.

Superordinate

4

9

ns.

Subordinate

0

2

ns.

Logical coordinate

8

11

ns.

12

12

ns.

1

3

ns.

10

13

ns.

Functional
Predication
Unscorable
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Results for the Chained Word
Association Paradigm
Sets of eight chained word associations were obtained for each subject following subliminal exposures to
the PEOPLE WALKING and DESTROY FATHER stimuli.

Associa-

tions were scored on a five-point scale of relatedness of
the response word to stem word (Moran, 1953).

!1eans,

standard deviations, and matched-pairs t test results for
relatedness scores are presented in Table 18.

These reveal

no significant differences in the relatedness of subjects'
associations given subsequent to the two subliminal stimuli.

This was the case for both the experimental and "no-

priming" control groups.
Table 19 presents these results broken down by
frequency of occurrence at each scored level of relatedness.

Again, binomial tests comparing the distributions

of these frequencies between the two subliminal stimuli
show no significant differences for both experimental and
control groups.
Following Silverman's hypothesis that subliminal
effects may be of short duration, this data was analyzed
using only the first four associations given subsequent
to subliminal exposures.

Summary statistics and matched-

pair t test results for the three relatedness scores thus
obtained are presented in Table 20.

Again, no significant

differences in relatedness were found between associations
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Table 18
Means, Standard Deviations, and Matched Pairs t Test
Results for Relatedness Scores
Experimental
(.!!,=24)

Control
(£=10)

17.29

17.80

3.42

3.71

18.04

16.70

2.87

4.47

Mean difference

-.75

1.10

so

3.51

2.33

-1.05

1.49

Stimulus
PEOPLE WALKING
M

so
DESTROY FATHER
M

so

t

of difference
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Table 19
Frequencies and Binomial Test Results for
Relatedness Scores

Score

PEOPLE WALKING

DESTROY FATHER

Experimental Subjects

Binomial
Test

(~=24}

0

6

3

ns.

1

26

19

ns.

2

30

36

ns.

3

95

98

ns.

4

11

12

ns.

Control Subjects

(~=10}

0

0

3

ns.

1

9

13

ns.

2

20

12

ns.

3

35

38

ns.

4

6

4

ns.
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Table 20
Means, Standard Deviations, and Matched-Pairs t Test
Results Using Only First Three Relatedness Scores
Following Each Stimulus Exposure

Stimulus

Experimental
(_!!=24)

Control
(_!!=10)

PEOPLE WALKING
M

7.25

7.50

SD

1.85

1.58

M

7.58

6.60

SD

2.00

2.76

Hean difference

-.33

.90

SD of difference

2.51

2.33

t

-.65

1.22

DESTROY FATHER
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given following the two subliminal stimuli.

In sum, sub-

liminal exposures to PEOPLE WALKING and DESTROY FATHER appear to have no differential effect on the relatedness of
subsequent chained word associations.
Discrimination Task Results
Thirty-three of the 34 subjects were given a discrimination task to test for the availability of partial
13
stimulus cues.
Of the 10 discriminations required, two
subjects were correct 9 times, two subjects 8 times, three
subjects 7 times, two subjects 6 times, twelve subjects 5
times, eight subjects 4 times, two subjects 3 times, one
subject 2 times, and one subject 1 time.

With a minimum

of 8 correct discriminations comprising a nonchance performance (£ < .OS, 1-tailed), four subjects met this criterion.

Though these performances may be chance occur-

rences in a subject group of this size, one cannot completely rule out the possibility that partial cues were
available for at least a few subjects.

As noted earlier

however, experimental group subjects correct on from 1 to
4 discriminations (£=7) and those correct 6 to 9 times
(£=7) did not differ in .. responsiveness .. scores in the
dart paradigm (t (12)

= -.01

ns.).

Thus, even if partial

cues were available to a few subjects, this appears un13

one subject did not complete this task due to
lack of time.
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likely to have affected results for at least the dart
paradigm.
For the group as a whole, the mean number of correct discriminations was 5.09 which did not significantly
differ from the expected 5 correct of 10 discriminations.
No significant differences were found between performance
of experimental and control subjects or between use of the
BEATING DAD or the PEOPLE WALKING/DESTROY FATHER pairs for
the discrimination task.

As the stimuli were presented

under the same conditions as existed during the experiment
proper, these results provide little evidence for the
presence of partial stimulus cues.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Dart Paradigm
The major conclusion to be drawn from these results
is that they failed to replicate any part of Silverman,
Ross, Adler, and Lustig's (1978) demonstration of "subliminal psychodynamic activation" with the dart-throwing
paradigm.

This was true for both oedipally-related stimuli

with separate experimental and "no-priming" control subject
groups.

The only statistically significant result obtained

here was for the "no-priming" control group and was a reversal of the results obtained in the original Silverman
study.
Before discussion of this result, possible explanations for this failure to replicate are considered.

These

include differences in procedure and materials, subject
groups, or experimenters.

Procedurally, every attempt was

made here to replicate the original study as exactly as
possible.

In both studies for example, the experiment was

called "Tournament" on subject sign-up forms.
kind of tachistoscope and dart board were used.

The same
The intro-

duction and priming stages of the experiments were almost
identical for the two studies.
102

Durations and frequencies
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of stimulus exposures were those reported by Silverman.
Room and stimulus field illuminations were within the range
14
of those reported for the original experiments.
Further,
stimulus materials were generated from copies of the original stimuli with the help of frequent consultation with
Silverman.

Ascending threshold data collected for the

stimuli used here met the recommendations of the original
author.

Finally, data collected from the discrimination

tasks were quite similar and support the absence of partial
cue availability in both studies.

Though slight or non-

obvious differences in equipment and stimuli were nonetheless present despite these precautions, it is unclear how
they might account for the radically different results obtained in the two studies.
Differences in subject groups are always possible
and could account for the differing results.

Available

demographic data show that subjects' ages were similar
(mean age of 18.6 here and 19.3, 19.6, and 19.5 for the
original experiments).

In both studies, all subjects were

college males and most were from introductory psychology
classes.

Subjects whose native language was not English

14The present experimenter may in fact have been
more meticulous than the original authors in specifying the
methods for obtaining illumination measurements and in
taking repeated measurements throughout the course of the
experiment (see METHOD). The original Silverman study does
not report measurement methods, gives only one illumination
reading for each experiment, and fails to report any pertinent data for one experiment.
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were excluded.

As Loyola University enrolls a large pro-

portion of Catholic students, differences in subjects'
religion may be considered.

For example, religious in-

volvement or history may in part determine meanings given
to the words "ok" and "wrong."

One can further speculate

that the word "dad" may evoke special meaning for Catholic
males if it is associated with the more religious "father."
In the present study however, comparison of subjects describing their religious preference as Catholic (both currently and as children) with non-Catholics revealed no difference in responsiveness to the dart paradigm.
Similarly, differences in subjects' associations to
words contained in the subliminally presented messages
could lead to different effects.

Data collected relevant

to the words "dad" and "beating" indicate subject differences in use and meaning bore no relation to amount of
effect in the dart paradigm.

Subjects' scores on CPI

scales also appeared unrelated to effect of either oedipally-related stimuli.

It thus appears highly unlikely

that measurable differences in stimulus word meaning, religion, or personality could have accounted for the drarnatically different results obtained by the original and
15
present subject groups.
No data are available which
15 An ordering of experimental subjects' overall
"responsiveness" scores (see METHOD section) revealed two
extreme groups of six subjects each. The "high-responsiveness" subjects had obtained total dart difference scores of
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could aid in determining whether the subject groups differed in other variables possibly related to subliminal
stimulation effects, e.g., hemisphericity (Sackeim, Packer,
& Gur, 1977), visual information processing speeds

(Browning-Crinion, Dolmetsch, & Mayzner, 1978), state of
arousal (Dixon, 1971), and level and type of drive-activation (Klein & Holt, 1960) •
Finally, differences in the experimenters need be
considered.

Three male experimenters ranging from 20 years

to early 30s in age obtained the predicted results in the
original study.

In the present study, one male experi-

menter, aged 26, failed to obtain the predicted results.
Though differences in appearance, manner, or personality
may have differentiated these experimenters, it is difficult to understand how they could have systematically affected subjects' responses to stimuli of which the experimenters were unaware.

Clearly, one can only speculate as

to how experimenter characteristics interacted with sub200 or greater, while the "low-responsiveness" group had
scores of 60 or less. Post-hoc comparisons of these groups
found no differences in religious preference, word used to
refer to father, meaning given to "beating," and discrimination task performance. Of 18 CPI scales, the "highresponsiveness" group scored significantly higher on Femininity and lower on Dominance, Capacity for status, Sense
of well-being, Communality, and Intellectual efficiency
(all E < .OS, 2-tailed). Any conclusions drawn from these
differences must be tempered by the fact that "responsiveness" scores were computed without regard to direction of
dart score (critical minus baseline) differences and so may
vary with "inconsistency in dart-throwing" rather than
amount of subliminal effect.
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liminally presented stimuli to change the unconscious meaning of the situation for subjects.
The one statistically significant result obtained
here was for a group of 10 subjects who did not receive
"priming" procedures.

Their results constituted a test of

Silverman•s (1965) hypothesis that for subliminal effects
to be obtained for normal subjects, the mental content that
the stimuli were intended to trigger had to be activated
by priming beforehand.

For this group only, the BEATING

DAD IS WRONG stimulus led to increased dart scores, a finding in the opposite direction of that found in the original
Silverman study.

In view of the small number of subjects,

reversal of effect, and possibility of Type I error, this
finding must be interpreted cautiously.
Examination of Table 7 reveals mean dart scores
varying closely around a grand mean of 473.16 with one
notable exception.

This is the mean of 434 for control

subjects following baseline stimulation associated with
BEATING DAD IS WRONG.

This implies that this critical

minus baseline difference attained significance due to
relatively lower scores following the neutral baseline
stimulation rather than because of higher scores following
the critical oedipal stimulation.

Following Silverman•s

theoretical notions, it is not clear why subliminal exposures to PEOPLE ARE SITTING and PEOPLE ARE STANDING were
followed by lowered dart-throwing accuracy.
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One possible explanation involves an order or practice effect.

Post-hoc analysis of control group dart

scores shows that the six subjects who received BEATING DAD
IS WRONG in the first position averaged 398.3 following the
associated baseline stimulation.

This compares to a base-

line mean of 487.5 for the four subjects receiving this
16
. l us ~n
. t h e second pos~t~on.
. .
st~mu
Reca ll'~ng th at b ase l'~ne
dart throws always preceded associated critical dart throws
(see Table 6), this indicates that the unusually low mean
baseline score associated here with the WRONG stimulus was
accounted for by the six subjects for whom this was the
first set of dart throws following stimulus exposures.
Thus, it may be that a practice effect seen in improvement
in dart-throwing accuracy from first set of throws to

second set in these six subjects accounted for the significant result observed.

The same pattern of scores was ob-

tained for the BEATING DAD IS OK baseline scores thoucfll-improvements from first to second set for these four sub17
.
d~d
. 'f'~cant d'ff
Jects
• not l ea d to an avera ll s~gn~
~
erence.
16 unequal group sizes (thus lack of counterbalancing
by stimulus order) resulted here from a blind re-ceding of
the stimulus cards while control subjects were being run.
l7A similar situation is found in results from the
10 pilot study subjects. Table 3 shows that both critical
dart scores are larger than their associated baseline
scores. Post-hoc analysis by position only (regardless of
subliminal stimulus) reveals the following means: 415 for
the first set of throws, 458 for second set, 460 for third,
and 492 for last set. Here, dart scores clearly increased
over the four trials independently of stimulus content. Thus,
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Aside from these post-hoc speculations, it is
notable that data from the 24 experimental subjects did not
replicate this result with the WRONG stimuli.

This oc-

curred despite random assignment to subject group, use of
identical materials and the same experimenter.

It is un-

clear how the inclusion of priming procedures could have
cancelled a significant dart score difference for the experimental group.

Post-hoc comparisons of the two subject

groups revealed no significant differences in religious
preference, word used to refer to fathers, meaning given to
"beating," and discrimination task scores.

Comparison of

the 18 CPI scales score also revealed no significant differences between groups (See Appendix

c for this analysis).

Though the possibility of unknown subject group or subjectexperimenter interaction effects cannot be completely
eliminated, the available evidence indicates striking
similarity between subject groups.
The preceding discussion makes evident the difficulty of explaining why the effect of the BEATING DAD IS
WRONG stimulus attained significance for one subject group
and not for the other, and why its direction was opposite
that found by Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978).
None of the possibilities mentioned are compelling for
the improvements in critical scores relative to their preceding baseline scores may represent little more than a
practice effect over trials of dart throws.
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their evidence, logic, or parsimony.

Perhaps a more cred-

ible explanation is that the result is due to random error,
despite having attained statistical significance.

That is,

it may represent a Type I error in which the null bypathesis is falsely rejected.

In any experiment, the likeli-

hood of a Type I error increases with the number of statistical tests (t tests here) employed.

This explanation has

the value of added parsimony as the results from the two
subject groups here could then be considered consistent and
the problem posed by the reversal of effect would be
eliminated.
Taken together, the major results of the present
study and those of Swanson (Note 1) represent four attempts to replicate Silverman's findings with the dart
paradigm.

They involve two experimenters and separate sub-

ject groups of 18, 20, 24, and 10.

Of the eight tests of

the major hypothesis (two stimuli x four subject groups) ,
18
not one replicated the original findings.
The two significant results obtained constituted reversals of original
results.

In sum, these results constitute a serious chal-

lenge to the generalizability of the original findings and
the theoretical rationale advanced to explain them.

Given

the care taken to replicate the original study as exactly
18

As noted on p. 107, n. 17. the statistically significant result obtained with 10 pilot subjects and the OK
stimulus most likely represents a practice effect rather
than a subliminal effect.
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as possible, they suggest that the findings of Silverman,
Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978} may have been dependent on
highly specific and unknown situational, subject, or experimenter variables.

The reversal of effect for one

stimulus creates doubt regarding Silverman's (1976} assertion that subliminal stimulation can directly activate
unconscious wishes or conflicts and lead to predictable
behavioral consequences for at least the dart paradigm.
These conclusions regarding the lack of generalizability
of the original findings are further supported by the
results of a recently published independent replication
attempt.

Despite attempts to maximize the probability of

replication by varying room illumination, number of ex·perimenters, and distance from threshold of the stimuli,
Heilbrun (1980} found no significant differences in dart
scores for three separate subject groups.
Word Association Paradigms
Results from the word association paradigms are
striking in their consistent failure to demonstrate
measurable effects of subliminal stimulation.

No signif-

icant differences were found between associations following the PEOPLE WALKING and DESTROY FATHER s.ublirninal
stimulations on three overall measures of response commonality, distribution of idiodynamic set frequencies and
response relatedness.

This was true for both discrete and
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chained associations with the experimental and "nopriming" control groups.

The few isolated instances of

statistically significant results are considered next.
Of the 12 sterns used for investigating response
commonality, only "lose" led to responses differing on
this measure for experimental subjects.

Here, the di-

rection of effect was opposite prediction in that stimulation by DESTROY FATHER led to more common associations.
This and the fact that this result did not occur for
control subjects suggest very cautious interpretation.
Similarly, it is unclear why for control subjects, the
two subliminal stimuli should differentially effect associations given to "walking" but not associations to the
11 other stems.
Analysis by idiodynamic set revealed that, for the
experimental group only, exposures to DESTROY FATHER led
to more associations classified as Contrast with fewer
classified as Predication.

Recalling the hypothesis that

this aggressive stimulus would produce disturbance in associative processes, this result is somewhat surprising.
Moran (1966) presents evidence suggesting that Contrast
associations represent the highest level in a hierarchical
ranking of idiodynamic sets in terms of linguistic sophistication, abstraction, and cognitive development.

Pre-

dication associations represent the lowest level in this
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hierarchy.

Following these notions, one would predict

fewer Contrast and

~

aggressive stimulation.

Predication responses following
Thus, the results obtained appear

difficult to attribute to differential effects of the subliminal stimuli and clearly need replication.
Finally, relatedness scores for the chained word
associations did not differ following exposures to the two
stimuli.

Analysis of just the first four associations in

each set also revealed no differences.

This last result

provides further evidence failing to support the hypothesis that subliminal effects are of very short duration.
Taken in sum, these results represent failure to
obtain subliminal effects using word association tasks as
dependent measures.

This occurred despite procedural at-

tempts to maximize the likelihood of a subliminal effect
by employing emotionally impactful stimuli and increasing
the frequency of stimulus exposures. 19 These results contrast to those reported by Dixon (1956, 1958, 1971) in
his studies of subliminal effects on word association.
Both procedures and materials used here were similar to
those used throughout Silverman's research program.

In

addition, the present relatedness measure resembles the
"number of deviant responses" measure used in some Silver19 rn addition, several of Dixon's (1971) methodological criticisms of the two failed replications of his
work were incorporated into the present procedures.
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man studies of word associations with schizophrenics
(e.g., Silverman & Spiro, 1967b).

In this light, the

present results constitute another failure to support
Silverman's (1976) assertions regarding the predictable
effects of subliminal stimulation.
General Considerations
In sum, the results of this investigation represent an overall failure to demonstrate measurable effects of subliminal stimuli.

The few statistically sig-

nificant results were usually opposite predicted .direction
and never obtained for both experimental and "no-priming"
control groups.

Given the large number of statistical

tests computed, these significant findings were viewed as
probable Type I errors and stand in need of replication.
As noted earlier, the only published independent
replication attempts of Silverman's work (Greenberg,
1977; Emmelkamp & Straatman, 1976; Heilbrun, 1980) also
obtained negative results.

The continued inability of

independent investigators to successfully replicate raises
serious questions as to the strength of the results of
Silverman's overall research program.

Contrary to the

assertions of Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978,
p. 354), subliminal effects do not appear to be strong and
reliable even when experimental stimuli, subjects' motivational state, and type of response measure are {apparently)
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congruent.

As in the 1950s and 1960s, subliminal per-

ception appears to be a fragile and ambiguous phenomena
that is not easily demonstrable (Eriksen, 1960; Wolitzky
& Wachtel, 1973).

In conclusion, possible reasons for the inability
of researchers to consistently demonstrate subliminal effects are briefly considered.

Within the psychoanalytic

framework, many studies have been designed from somewhat
simplistic theoretical notions.

Silverman's work (1976),

for example, appears based on the assumption that a complex verbally coded message can bypass usual defensive
operations to directly affect significant unconscious
fantasies or conflicts.

This assumption appears to ignore

the complex nature and purposes attributed to defense
mechanisms by psychoanalytic theorists (e.g., A. Freud,
1936/1966).

It is also difficult to envision how stim-

ulus content could have such a direct and specific effect
on unconscious processes.

The mechanisms underlying

translation of a verbal or simple pictorial message into
something impacting on primary-process or unconscious
events are given scant attention by Silverman and other
researchers.

This casts doubt on the validity of the

"subliminal psychodynamic activation" paradigm as a method
for testing psychoanalytic hypotheses.
In addition, subjects differ on variables which
may mediate subliminal effects.

For example, rates of

115
processing briefly presented verbal information show large
individual differences (Browning-Crinion, Dolmetsch, &
Mayzner, 1978).

Similarly, one might expect large in-

dividual differences in the amounts and ways that information is processed when presented subliminally.

This

would make difficult the task of establishing stimulus
parameters for which all (or most) subjects could show
subliminal effects.

Individual differences might also be

expected in subjects' defensive organization and the content of unconscious wishes and conflicts.

Many attempted

demonstrations of subliminal effects appear to rest on the
assumption that particular unconscious contents (e.g.,
oedipal conflict) are common to all subjec.ts.

Related to

this is the psychoanalytic notion that individuals differ
widely in the ways that unconscious wishes or conflicts
are consciously experienced and behaviorally expressed
(Fenichel, 1945}.

This may help to explain why subliminal

effects are difficult to predict for a group of subjects.
Finally, consideration must be given to the serious
methodological and theoretical criticisms that have been
directed towards subliminal perception research in general
(see REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE} .

Numerous authors

(e.g., Guthrie & Wiener, 1966) have argued that many
"demonstrations" of subliminal effects have depended on
methodological artifacts (e.g., partial cue availability).
Continued failure to replicate previous findings con-
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stitutes the most serious challenge to the concept.
Clearly, it remains for future research to convincingly
demonstrate that subliminal perception is a replicable
phenomenon and a valid construct.

SUMMARY
Beginning with Otto Poetzl's (1917/1960) study of
the role of unnoticed stimuli in dream formation and continuing with George Klein's (1967) work on peripheral
trains of thought, many psychoanalytically oriented researchers have viewed subliminal perception as a method
to study cognitive processes hypothesized to occur outside of awareness.

Reviews of the many hundreds of re-

ported studies have generally concluded that the effects
of subliminal stimulation are weak, ambiguous, or nonexistent.

In contrast, Lloyd Silverman and associates

have published over 25 studies consistently reporting subliminal effects for a variety of normal and clinical
groups (Silverman, 1976) .

In the context of investigating

relationships between particular unconscious conflicts
and psychopathological behavior, each study involves sub-

.

liminal exposures to wish or conflict-related and neutral
'

stimuli followed by assessment of their effect on behavior.
The present investigation included a careful replication attempt of Silverman's study on the effect of
oedipally-related stimuli on competitive behavior, i.e.,
dart-throwing accuracy (Silverman, Ross, Adler, & Lustig,
117
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1978).

The verbal stimuli BEATING DAD IS OK and BEATING

DAD IS WRONG with associated pictorial stimuli were presented through a Scientific Prototype three-field tachistoscope (Model N-1000) at 4 msec durations.

No signif-

icant results were obtained for a group of 24 undergraduate males.

For a "no-priming" group of 10 subjects, the

WRONG stimuli led to a significant increase in dart
scores (£ < .02, 2-tailed).

This was opposite the direc-

tion of Silverman's original findings and may represent
a "practice effect" over trials.

Subjects' religious

preference, associations to stimulus words, California
Personality Inventory scale scores, and performance on a
stimulus discrimination task appeared unrelated to direction and extent of effect for this paradigm.
The investigation also addressed two criticisms
of much subliminal perception research--that stimuli used
are insufficient in emotional impact and so have negligible
effect and that dependent measures are insensitive to the
subtle effects of subliminal stimulation on peripheral
trains of thought.

Subjects were subliminally exposed to

the more aggressively-charged stimulus DESTROY FATHER with
picture and to the (relatively} neutral PEOPLE WALKING.
Subsequent chained and discrete word associations were
compared on measures of response commonality (relative
frequency of a response in a normative sample}, quality of
relatedness of response to stem words (Moran, 1953) and
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structural relationship of response

~o

stem (idiodynamic

sets of Moran, Mefferd, & Kimble, 1964).
differences were found on any measure.

No overall
The few differ-

ences for individual items were often opposite prediction,
did not obtain for both subject groups, and so were viewed
as probable Type I errors and in need of replication.
Along with other failed replication attempts, these
results constitute a challenge to the generalizability of
the original Silverman findings and the theoretical rationale advanced to explain them.

They further highlight

the fragile and ambiguous nature of subliminal perception
effects in general.
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II.

Details of Experimenter-Subject Interaction

When S. arrives: I'm Bob Swanson and as you may know from
the name of th1s experiment, this is a study of factors
that influence competitive performance. We can begin by
your reading and signing this information sheet which explains most of what we'll be doing. {ShowS. information/
consent sheet.) I want to re-emphasize that your responses will be kept in confidence and that you can withdraw from the experiment at any time without penalty.
Reassurance about tach: Before we get to the tournament
part of the exper1ment which will involve throwing darts
at the dart board up there, I want to explain what this
equipment is. This is a tachistoscope and it will be used
in the experiment. It can regulate precisely the amount
of time a picture or message can be flashed and seen. In
this experiment we will be flashing messages or pictures
at a speed of four one-thousands of a second, a speed at
which you would probably be aware only of a brief flash
or flicker of light. The messages or pictures should
register in your mind however, and after the experiment
you will have an opportunity to find out about the content
of the stimuli you were shown. Do you wear corrective
lens for any reason? Do you have any questions about what
we'll be dolng?
Questionnaire: Now I would like you to fill out this
questionnaire. Be sure to include a permanent mailing
address as I'll be mailing the results to all subjects at
the end of the study.
Rorschach Card 4: Now I am going to show you an ink blot,
and I want you to tell me what you imagine you see. There
are no right or wrong answers. Different people imagine
different kinds of things. If you should see more than
one thing in the card, then tell me everything it looks
like to you. {Do inquiry for location only and allow no
more than 8 responses.)
TAT Card 7 BM: Now I am going to show you a picture, and
I would like you to make up a story about the picture,
having a past, present, and a future.
(Inquire into outcome if not spontaneously given. Inquire if an emotional
description is used that is unclear.)
TAT Card 6 BM: Now I am going to show you another picture,
and I would like you to make up a story about the picture,
having a past, present, and a future.
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TAT Story (to Card 6 BM) and Recall: Now I am going to
read you a story we made up for the purpose of this experiment about this picture, and I will ask you to recall
it back to me after I finish reading it.
(Read story.)
I would like you to recall the story as best you can, and
tell it back to me.
Explanation of Tournament: Okay, now we come to the
tournament. As you can see, the top places so far are
listed over here. The top three places in the tournament
will receive cash prizes of $12, $8, and $5.
I am going
to have you throw a total of 32 darts. You will throw
four series of eight darts, and before each series you
will sit down and look into the tach. Your grand score,
every dart, will count in the tournament. Before I give
you the instructions about that, why don't you step over
there and throw some practice darts? Stand behind that
line and throw all eight darts. Make sure you throw them
hard enough so they stick. If a dart doesn't stick in, or
if it falls out, your score for that throw will be zero.
However, if a dart falls out of the bullseye, it will
count as 100 points. The bullseye is defective.
(S.
throws eight darts. After each series of eight darts,
return darts to table next to S. Have s. throw a second
series of eight darts.)
Tournament Procedure: Now I want you to sit in that chair
and look into the tach.
I will be at the controls over
here, and I will say "Ready" and then press a button which
will produce two flickers of light three seconds apart.
After seeing several flashes you will get up, walk to the
line, and throw a series of eight darts. Then you will
sit down and look into the tach again. If you have any
questions, I'd like you to hold them until the end of the
experiment, and we can discuss them then. Now, look into
the tach. Do you see a red dot? Okay, try to focus on
that. During the time we are doing this part of the experiment, try not to blink, and don't look up from the
machine. I will show you a set of flashes, wait a few
seconds, then show you another set. You will see four
sets of flickers in all. Okay. Ready . . . (After first
two flashes, ask)
Did you see any flickers?
(After first
set of flashes, ask) Tell me what you saw.
(Then instruct
S. to just tell you if they don't see any flickers or if
they see something different.
Instruct S. to look into
viewer while changing stimulus cards. Be sure blank field
is illuminated.)
First Association Procedure:
(Change ISis on tach.}
How
are you feeling? We're done with the tournament part of
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the experiment and now we're going to do something different.
I'm going to flash some more pictures and messages
and ask you for some word associations. This time, the
flickers will be two seconds apart. After several flickers,
the red dot will come back on. When you see the red dot,
I want you to say aloud the first word that comes into your
mind. Following that, I'll repeat the word you said and I
want you to again say the first word that comes into mind.
Then I'll say that word and you should give another association. Every time I say a word you say aloud the
first word that comes to mind. Be sure to say single words
rather than phrases or sentences. During this part of the
experiment, I want you to relax physically and mentally as
much as possible. Try not to inhibit or to structure your
responses in any way. Just relax and say whatever word
comes to your mind. Do you have any questions about this?
Okay, I want you to get as comfortable as you can and to
focus your eyes on the red dot. As soon as the red dot
comes back on, say aloud whatever word comes to mind. Then
you'll give associations to words I say. Ready . . .
(Be sure S looks into viewer while giving associations.)
Second Association Procedure: Okay, that was fine.
Now
I 1 m going to flash some more pictures and messages and
ask you for some more word associations. Thi~ time when
the red dot comes back on, I'll say a word from this list
and I want you to say aloud the first word that comes into
your mind. I'll say twelve different words in all and
after I say each one, you say the first word that comes
to mind. Again, I want you to relax as much as you can
and to try not to inhibit or structure your responses in
any way. Do you have any questions? Okay, get comfortable
in the chair and focus your eyes on the red dot. Ready
Third Association Procedure:
(Be sure S. looks into
viewer while changing stimuli.)
Now I'm going to flash
some more pictures and messages and I want you to say the
first word that comes to mind as soon as the red dot comes
back on. Then I'll repeat the word you said and you give
another association. Then I'll repeat that word and so on.
This is just like what we did a few minutes earlier. Do
you understand? If you'll get comfortable and focus on the
red dot.
Ready . . .
Discrimination Task:

(See instruction sheet.)

Debriefing: We are finished now. As I told you at the
beginning, my interest in this experiment was to see whether
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your dart throwing and word associations could be effected by the subliminal messages you were receiving.
What I plan to do at the end of this experiment is to
send a letter to all of the subjects and tell you what
the results of the study were. I will also tell you the
exact messages that you subliminally received. I would
prefer to wait until everybody has been run through the
study before revealing to anyone what the subliminal
stimuli are. Is that all right with you? (If s. wants
to know at this time what the stimuli are, show them to
him and ask him to keep this information secret.) Do you
have any questions or concerns about the experiment? How
did you feel during the time you were looking into the
tach? How do you feel now? If you think of any other
questions or have any other concerns related to this
study, feel free to contact me at any time at the phone
numbers listed on the scheduling card.
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III.

Consent to Participate in Experiment "Tournament"

There are many things which affect a person's competitive performance. One important group of factors, we
believe, is the way in which people see, and/or remember
faint or indistinct experiences. By experimentally studying this group of factors in people involved in competitive
situations we hope to better understand how performance may
be hindered or improved.
If you decide to participate in this study you will
be asked to throw darts at a dartboard, answer some questions, make up short stories, and look at quickly flashed
lights which will be words or pictures. From past experience with these and similar procedures we expect no ill
effect to you. Also, we expect to learn a great deal
about how competitive performance is affected, which,
hopefully, will be useful one day in helping people in
various realms of endeavor.
In the second part of this study, you will be asked
to look at quickly flashed lights which will be words or
pictures, and then say the first thought or word that comes
into your mind. After that, you will be asked to complete
a personality inventory and answer a brief questionnaire.
From this, we expect to learn more about the mental
processes involved in experiencing faint or indistinct
stimuli.
You do not have to participate in this study, and
if you do agree to participate you can still change your
mind at any time and withdraw from the study. Your decision will in no way be held against you. This is simply
a research study. All information will remain strictly
confidential.
I have agreed to participate in the experiment
"Tournament" and hereby give my consent to be a subject.
The experimenter has explained the procedures of the experiment to me and has described discomforts or inconveniences I may be subjected to, if any. I understand
that my responses will be kept in the strictest of confidence and anonymity. I have the option to withdraw
from this experiment at any time without penalty and I
also have the right to request that my responses not be
used.

Date

Subject's Signature
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IV.

Priming Questionnaire

Name

Age

Address

------

---------------------------------------------------------G.P.A. ----Married? -----Parent? ----

Level of Education

Father's Occupation_____________Your Occupational Goal _____
By circling the appropriate letter please indicate
to what extent you agree or disagree with the statements
below.
a) strongly agree
b) agree
c) disagree
d) strongly disagree
A.

I am a competitive person.
a b c d

B.

I would rather be "alone, at the top" than part of
the masses.
a b c d

c.

I have a relatively conflict-free relationship with
my mother.
a b c d

D.

I am close with my mother.
a b c d

E.

I have a relatively conflict-free relationship with
my father.
a b c d

F.

I am close with my father.
a b c d

G.

It is difficult for me to be assertive with other
people.
a b c d

H.

I am prone to feel guilty about things more than most
people.
a b c d
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I.

Most people would consider my father a success.
a b c d

J.

I consider my father a success.
a b c d
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V. Story for Story Recall (to Card 6 BM)
(Let S look at card while listening to the story)
This a mother and her son standing there in a state
of stunned silence. Just moments before, the father was
also there, but he has stormed out of the room feeling extremely angry towards his son. They had had a loud argument in which the son told his father that he was no longer
competent to run the family business, that he should retire,
and that he (the son) should take over. Since the mother
plays an important role in the running of the business,
this would give the son an opportunity to fulfill a longharbored secret wish of his: to spend more time with her
and enjoy more often the closeness they've shared in the
past. In his anger at being criticized by his son, the
father ostracized the son and threatened to exclude him altogether from the family business. As he stormed out of
the room he cautioned: "Just remember who's still the
father around here." The son is now feeling guilty and
fears that he may have overstepped his bounds. He is also
afraid that he has threatened the closeness which he and
his father often experience together. The mother is torn
between her love for her husband and her love for her son.
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VI.

Discrimination Task

"Okay, there's just one more thing we're going to do. I
have two sets of cards here and I want to see whether you
can tell them apart when I flash them on at the same speed
I did during the experiment. Try as hard as you can because the person who does the best on this will win a $5
cash prize. I am going to show you four pairs of exposures of one set of slides, which will be followed by
four pairs of exposures of either the same set or a different set. After the second set of four exposures and
after each set after that I want you to tell me whether
you think the set you just saw was the same or different
than the set right before it. You will be comparing each
set of exposures to the set you saw right before it.
Okay, now if you would put your eyes up against the viewer,
we can get started. During this task, please don't look
up; keep your eyes focused into the machine. Here's four
exposures of the first set (exposures). Now I'm going to
show you four more exposures of either the same or a different set. Just say 'same' or 'different' to indicate
what you think (exposures) . Now for another four exposures and tell me if they are the same as or different
than the one you just saw (exposures)." Continue, following the order of trials in column I below.
"Now we're going to do the same thing with another two
sets of cards. Here are four exposures of the first set
(exposures) • Now here are four exposures of another set
and like before you say 'same' or 'different' (exposures)."
Follow the order of trials in column II below.
Give the ten trials in column I utilizing the BEATING DAD
IS OK and BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimuli pairs. Then give
the ten trials in column II utilizing the PEOPLE WALKING and DESTROY FATHER stimulus pairs. Be sure to show
both the verbal and pictorial stimuli for each set or-exposures.
N.B. When you put in the same stimulus be sure to pull it
out of the chamber and put it in again so that S is not
cued by the sound of what you are doing as to whether the
next exposures will be "same" or "different." Also, attempt to shield the pictorial stimuli from S's view when
putting it into the tach.
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I.

Subject Questionnaire
Name

--------------------------Date
---------------------------

The following questions ask for your immediate emotional
response to several words. This is not a test of how well
you can recall dictionary definitions-of words, but rather
an inquiry into the different ways people understand words
on an emotional level. Thus, the first image or thought
that comes to mind upon seeing these words is the best
answer. Please indicate your choice in the space provided to the left of each question. If no answer is applicable, write in your choice next to "Other." All responses will be kept in strictest confidence.

1.

My first thought or image when I see the word
HAT is most closely associated with:
A. Glove
B. Head
c. Coat
D. Baseball
E. Other

-----------

2.

My first thought or image when I see the word
FATHER is most closely associated with:
A. Priest
B. Mother
c. To sire
D. Dad
E. Other

-----------

3.

My first thought or image when I see the word
DAD is most closely associated with:
A. Priest
B. Mom
c. Father
D. A man
E. Other

--------

4.

My first thought or image when I see the word
BEATING is most closely associated with:
A. Strike or hit repeatedly
B. Win in competion
C. Exhaustion or fatigue
D. Beatniks
E. Other

---------
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5.

My first thought of image when I see the word
DESTROY is most closely associated with:
A. Demolish
B. Kill
c. Defeat
D. Beat
E. Other _ _ _ _ __

6.

Indicate the word that most clearly communicates to you the idea of "defeating someone in
competiton."
A. Beating
B. Winning over
D. Defeating
D.
Destroying
E. Whipping or whupping
F. Other

------

7.

Indicate the word that most emphatically and
immediately communicates aggression to you.
A. Annihilate
·
B. Beat
c. Demolish
D. Destroy
E. Kill
E'. Other

------

8.

Indicate the word that most immediately calls
to mind the man who raised you.
A.
Dad
B. Daddy
C. Father
D. Pa
E.
Pop
F. Other

------

The following questions ask about your religious preferences and other personal history which may in part determine responses to various subliminal stimuli.
Please indicate your answer as you did above. Again, all responses
will be kept in strictest confidence.
9.

When I was a young child, the religious preference of my family could best be described as:
A. Catholic
B. Judaic
C.
Protestant
D. None
E. Other

------
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10.

As a young child, my family and I attended religious services approximately how often?
A. Three or more times per week
B. Two times per week
C. Once per week
D. Once per month
E. Only on holidays or for special observances
F. Rarely or never

11.

Compared to other families, I would rate my
family's involvement in religion when I was a
young child as follows:
1

2

not
involved
12.

3
average

4

5
extremely
involved

At present, my own religious preference could
best be described as:
A. Catholic
B. Judaic
C. Protestant
D. None
E.
Other

------

13.

In the past year, I attended religious services approximately how often?
A. Three or more times per week
B.
Two times per week
C. Once per week
D. Once per month
E. Only on holidays or for special observances
F. Rarely or never

14.

Compared to other people, I would rate my
oresent involvement in religion as follows:
1

not
involved

15.

2

3
average

4

5
extremely
involved

When I was a young child, I used the following
word to refer to the man who raised me:
A. Dad
B. Daddy
C. Father
D. Pa
E.
Pop
F. Other

------
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16.

At present, I use the following word to refer
to the man who raised me:
A.
B.

C.
D.

E.
F.

Dad
Daddy
Father
Pa
Pop
Other

-------

Use the back of this sheet to write any reactions or comments to this questionnaire or any other part of the study.
Thanks.
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II.

Relatedness of the Response Word to Stem Word
from L. J. Moran (1953)

Scale

Description

4

synonym, antonym, or common
opposite

3

category, example, function,
or attribute

2

sentence completion, word extension, and other loose relationships, i.e., past tense
(if not functional relationship)

1

a single, apparently unrelated word

0

multiword, repetition, blank
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III.

Idiodynamic Sets in Word Association

from L. J. Moran, Roy B. Mefferd, Jr., J. P. Kimble, Jr.
{1964)

SCORING MANUAL FOR STRUCTURAL VARIABLES
SYNONYM
A.

Response word {R) has exactly the same meaning as the
stimulus word {S) in one or more ordinary and appropriate contexts.

B.

1.

R is a synonym of S if R can be substituted for S
.)
such that {
R .) means exactly the same as

in some ordinary and appropriate sentence (

{

2.

.)

Sentence frame:
(

C.

s

R

•)

s
.)
----

is equivalent to

1.

It is important to note that R need have only one
equivalent meaning as s in order to be scored as
a synonym of S.

2.

Permit syntactic change in S or R for sentence
frame fitting.

3.

(
S
.) and (
R
.) must communicate exactly
the same meaning. Scorer has considerable license
in choosing (
.); however, once a given
(
.) is chosen, the interchange of S and R
must yield exact equivalence. Even subtle generic
differences in S and R are sufficient to force R
to be scored elsewhere, i.e., in Superordinate or
Subordinate.
Exception: S-R adjective pairs such as "large,"
"enormous"; "large," "huge"; "pretty," "beautiful"; "small," "tiny"; in which one adjective indicates a "greater degree" of the adjectival characteristic denoted by the other are scored as synonyms in spite of their connotative difference.
Usually the adjective A' denoting "greater degree"
can be defined in terms of the other adjective A
by the model, (A' means very A.).
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D.

Priority:
If R satisfies the requirements for Synonym, R is
scored under this category in preference to any
other.

CONTRAST
A.

R negates or contrasts with the meaning of S in one or
more ordinary and appropriate contexts.

B.

1.

R and S are in contradistinction if R can be substituted for S in some ordinary and appropriate
sentence (
.) such that (
R
• ) negates
or constrasts with (
S
.)

2.

Sentence frame:
with (
R
.)

1.

S and R are either antonyms or strong contrasts.
In either case, S and R are commonly used in ordinary discourse to denote strong contradistinction. A necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for contradistinction is, not both (
s
.)
and (
R
.) can be true under the same conditions.

2.

Permit syntactic change in S or R for sentence
frame fitting.

3.

If S and R are contrasts, they usually make sense
in a sentence in which the phrase "S or R" occurs.
For example, the pair "hot," "cold" makes sense in
sentences such as "Is it cold or hot out-doors?"

C.

D.

Priority:

s
.)
----

negates or contrasts

over Logical Coordinate.

1.

Contrasts are likely to be confused with logical
coordinates, since they usually satisfy the criteria for logical coordinates. They are distinguished from logical coordinates by the presence
of a contrasting difference.

2.

As a rule, if S-R are contrasts their sense is
bi-polar.
If S-R are logical coordinates, their
sense is not bi-polar~ there are usually many
other R's which could be logical coordinates of
S. For example, compare "hot," "cold"~ with
"red," "blue." Note that to "hot" it is dif-
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ficult to give another exact contrast. To "red"
it is easy to give several words, each of which is
a logical coordinate.
SUPERORDINATE
A.

S denotes an immediate member of the class or category by R.

B.

1.

R is a superordinate of S if S and R can be substituted meaningfully in the sentence frame (S
is a member of the class of R.) and if the
sentence is non-trivial.

2.

Sentence frames:

a.
b.
c.
d.

C.

s is a member of the class R.
s is a kind of R.
s is an example or instance

of R.
Plural forms of a, b, c.

1.

The requirement that the valued sentence frame
must be non-trivial is designed to restrict the
"logical distance" between S and R. If the valued
sentence frame is non-trivial, then s is an immediate member of R and is scored under this category. For example, "red," "color" could be scored
under this category since "color" categorizes
"red" in a non-trivial manner. However, "red,"
"entity" would not be scored under Superordinate
since the extension of "entity" is so broad that
it categorizes "red" non-specifically.

2.

Permit syntactic change in S or R for sentence
frame fitting.

3.

By "non-trivial" is meant any word which is commonly used in the definition of S to indicate a
generic class to which R belongs.

SUBORDINATE
A.

R denotes an immediate member of the class or category denoted by S.

B.

1.

R is a subordinate of S if S and R can be substituted meaningfully in the sentence frame (R
is a member of the class S.) and if the sentence
is non-trivial.
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C.

a. R is a member of the class s.
b. R is a kind of s.
c. R is an example or instance
of s.
d. Plural forms of a, b, c.

2.

Sentence frames:

1.

Converse of Superordinate.

2.

Permit syntactic modification of S or R for
sentence frame fitting.

3.

By "non-trivial" is meant a term which is commonly
used in the definition of S to indicate a member
of the class denoted by s.

LOGICAL COORDINATE
A.

S and R separately denote immediate members (of equal
logical order) of the same class or category.

B.

1.

S and R are logical coordinates if S and R can be
substituted meaningfully in the sentence frame
(S and Rare members of the class X.) and if a
value can be assigned to X which makes the sentence
non-trivial.

2.

Sentence frames:

1.

The requirement that the valued sentence frame
must be non-trivial is designed to restrict the
"logical distance" between S and R and the class
X. If the valued sentence frame is trivial, then
S and R are distant members of X, and are not
scored under th~s category. The intention here is
to force a selection of a value for X which logically subsumes S and R in a non-trivial manner.
As a matter of fact, almost any S-R pair could be
subsumed under some broad, nonspecific categories.
For example, "water" and "paper" can be categorized as "substance," but the categorization is
trivial. However, to categorize "red" and "blue"
as "colors" is a non-trivial categorization.

C.

a. S and R are members of the
class X.
b. S and R are kinds of X.
c. S and R are examples or instances of X.
d. S is a member of the class
X and R is a member of the
class X.
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D.

2.

Permit syntactic change in S or R for sentence
frame fitting.

3.

By "non-trivial" is meant any word which is commonly used in the definition of S or R to indicate
a generic class to which S and R belong.

Priority:

Yields to Contrast and Functional.

FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
A.

S and R each separately denote entities, processes or
events between which there is an explicit functional
relationship.

B.

1.

R is scored under this category if S and R can be
substituted meaningfully in either the sentence
frame (SXR.) or (RXS.) where X is any predicational phrase denoting a functional relationship.

2.

Sentence frames:

1.

The intention here is to categorize a considerable
variety of functional relationships. Consider the
following examples and the sentence frames which
they satisfy.

c.

a. S is the (a) cause of R.
b. S is the (a) manifestation
of R.
c. S is the (a) necessary or
usual condition for the existence of R.
d. S is the (a) necessary or
usual condition for the
proper functioning, performance, or accomplishment of R.
e. S is the (a) necessary or
usual precondition for the
use of R.
f. S uses R.
g. S is used simultaneously with
or for R.
h. S produces R.
i. The lack of S is the cause
of • . . (a-h) .
j. Interchange location of S and
R in each of the preceding.
k. Plural forms of each of the
preceding.
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"lightning," "thunder"
"fire," "smoke"
"enjoyment," '~applause"
"soil," "plants
"teacher," "pupil"
"conductor," "orchestra"
"boat," "water
"carpenter," "hammer"
"hammer, " "nail"
"farmer," "vegetables"

D.

(a)
(a) or (b)
(a) or (b)
(c}
(d)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

2.

Permit syntactic modifications of S or R for
sentence frame fitting.

3.

Note that this category is designed for noun pairs.
The rule permits syntactic modifications of S or
R and allows s and R to be converted into corresponding noun forms. However, the syntactic modification is permitted only in those cases in which
there is an explicit functional relation between
S and R and a syntactic change is necessary in
order that S and R will fit the sentence frames.

Priority: over Logical Coordinate. Some difficulties
arise in discriminating Function relation from Action
of or Upon S and Action of or Upon R. Since a syntactic modification of S or R is permitted under Functional, some noun-verb pairs are converted into nounnoun pairs. The most important factor in deciding to
convert a noun-verb pair into a noun-noun pair is
whether or not the verb actually denotes a function of
that denoted by the noun. If so, the verb should be
converted to a noun and scored under Functional.
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CPI Scale Means and t Test Results Comparing
Experimental and Control Subjects

Scale
Dominance
Capacity for status
Sociability
Social presence
Self-acceptance
Sense of well-being
Responsibility
Socialization
Self-control
Tolerance
Good impression
Communality
Achievement via conformance
Achievement via independence
Intellectual efficiency
Psychological-mindedness
Flexibility
Femininity

Experimental
<n=24 >
29.13
18.67
26.25
38.21
23.25
31.29
25.63
33.50
22.33
18.58
14.50
23.29
25.29
17.50
36.21
11.21
10.54
16.46

Control
<n=lO >
28.70
19.60
25.00
36.80
23.30
32.60
24.90
34.50
23.90
19.00
15.50
25.00
25.20
19.30
36.10
12.60
11.20
17.40

t
.20
-.63
.77
.60
-.03
-.53
.46
-.47
-.60
-.22
-.63
-1.11
.OS
-1.02
.04
-1.31
-.40
-.79
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Ethical Considerations Relevant to the Present Investigation
--submitted by the author in October, 1979 to the Institutional Review Board of Loyola University.
Beginning with McGinnies' (1949) report that taboo
words had elevated recognition thresholds compared to other
words, many psychoanalytically-oriented researchers hoped
that subliminal perception would serve as a method to study
cognitive processes hypothesized to occur outside of
awareness. Reviews of the many hundreds of studies conducted in the past 30 years have generally concluded that
the effects of subliminal stimulation are weak, ambiguous,
or non-existent (e.g., Eriksen, 1960; Dixon, 1971; Wolitzky & Wachtel, 1973). In contrast to these findings,
Lloyd Silverman and his associates at New York University
have published over 25 studies (summarized in Silverman,
1976) reporting slight subliminal effects for a variety of
normal and clinical groups.
Each study involves tachistoscopic presentations of emotionally-relevant and neutral
verbal and pictorial stimuli at levels below conscious
recognition followed by some assessment of their effect on
behavior. Given the complexity of the stimuli used and
the wide range of behavioral effects reported, these results are quite provocative as they are not easily explained by most current theories of visual information
processing (e.g., Neisser, 1967).
Despite a prodigious outpouring of supportive
research from Silverman's laboratory, the few independent
replications of his work found in the literature failed to
obtain predicted results (Greenberg, 1977; Ernrnelkamp &
Straatman, 1976). The strength of the results of Silverman's research program can also be questioned on methodological grounds (Swanson, Note 1). In an attempt to encourage further replication, Silverman, Ross, Adler, and
Lustig (1978) report results of four experiments using a
relatively simple methodology and college males as subjects. The study investigated the effect of subliminal
presentation of oedipally-related stimuli on subsequent
competitive performance (in dart-throwing).
In an attempted replication with more stringent experimental controls, Swanson (Note 1) obtained results quite different
from those of the original study. For this author, exposure to the BEATING DAD IS OK verbal and pictorial
stimuli led to no significant change in subjects' dart
scores, while exposure to BEATING DAD IS WRONG led to
significant increases in dart scores, a finding in the
opposite direction of that obtained by the original
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authors. In addition, a second experimenter obtained no
significant effects with either stimulus. These results
raise more doubts about the strength and reliability of
subliminal effects.
The present study proposes a further replication
and extension of these findings. Subjects participate
individually and are drawn from the Loyola Psychology
Department subject pool. Following an explanation of
procedures and signing of an information/consent form
(attached here), each subject is given "priming" material
identical to that used in the earlier studies. This includes a brief questionnaire (attached here), a Rorschach
card, two TAT stories, and a story recall task. Subjects
then view oedipally-related and neutral stimuli presented
through a tachistoscope. Stimulus exposure times are so
brief (4 msec) and illumination levels are set in such a
way that subjects report seeing only a brief flash or
flicker of light. The effects of these exposures are
measured by subsequent performance in dart-throwing and by
a brief association task where subjects are asked to say
the first word that comes to mind in response to words
spoken by the experimenter. The stimuli to be presented
include brief verbal statements and very simple line
drawings associated with each statement. The verbal
statements inciude: PEOPLE ARE SITTING, PEOPLE ARE STANDING, BEATING DAD IS OK, BEATING DAD IS WRONG, DESTROY
FATHER, and PEOPLE WALKING. Copies of these stimuli and
other information are available on request.
In order to clarify the meaning of the differences in results obtained in the two studies mentioned
above, several subject variables will also be investigated. Subjects will be asked to complete the California
Personality Inventory and respond to a questionnaire
(attached here) inquiring into idiosyncratic meanings
given to stimulus words and religious history. Debriefing procedures follow. The results will bear on issues
in visual information processing, subliminal perception
research, and psychoanalytic personality research.
In evaluating the potential risks of these procedures, it is important to note that many hundreds of
subliminal perception studies and reviews ha~;e been published in the past 30 years. To this author's knowledge,
not a single incident of ill-effect to any subject has
ever been reported. This includes numerous studies in
which the stimuli presented were clearly of a more emotionally-charged nature than those of the present study.
A few examples follow. Klein, Spence, Holt, and Goure-
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vitch (1958) subliminally presented realistic drawings of
male and female genitalia. Along these same lines, a
study by O'Grady (1977) included subliminal presentations
of photographs of explicit emotionally-charged sexual
scenes clipped from sources such as Juicy Jugs (March,
1975) and Studies in Danish Homosexual Porno ra h (1970).
Eagle (1959 presente graph~c p~ctures of a young man
stabbing a bleeding older man. Verbal stimuli presented
subliminally by Tyrer, Lewis, and Lee (1978) included the
following words: cancer, death, coffin, V.D., guilt,
mutilate, and plague. Finally, Silverman (1976, 1977)
reports studies with normals and schizophrenics involving
subliminal presentations of verbal and associated pictorial
stimuli including: CANNIBAL EATS PERSON, DESTROY MOTHER,
MURDERER STABS VICTIM and FUCK MOMMY. These are only a
few examples of the many studies in which subjects have
subliminally viewed highly emotionally-charged stimuli.
No incidents of ill-effect for any subject have been reported in the literature.
Despite a few recent popular accounts of "subliminal advertising" and public concern about this in the
1950s, scholarly reviews have consistently found the effects of subliminal stimulation to be weak, of short duration, and usually non-replicable (Adams, 1957; McConnell,
Cutler & McNeil, 1958; Bevan, 1964; Wolitsky & Wachtel,
1973; Swanson, Note 1). Current research (including the
present study) continues to focus on demonstrating any
observable effect, no matter how small, temporary, and
indirect. Even researchers who more readily accept the
existence of the phenomenon (Silverman, 1976) note that
the effects rarely last for more than a few minutes.
This conclusion is based on results of studies such as
Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978) and Swanson
(Note 1) in which experimental stimulation precedes control stimulation by only a minute or two. Here, no
residual effect from the experimental stimulation is observed in assessments immediately following the control
stimulation.
Though the possibility of risk to any subject appears highly unlikely, several safeguards are built into
the present study. Following a brief verbal introduction
by the experimenter, each subject reads an information/
consent form (attached here) describing the rudiments and
rationale of the experimental procedures. The experimenter again explains that stimuli will be presented below levels of recognition and reassures the subject as to
confidentiality and his option to withdraw at any time
while still receiving credit for his participation.
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Subjects are told they will have a chance to examine the
stimuli at the end of the experiment. The experimenter
than encourages the subject to voice any questions or concerns before beginning the "priming" procedures. These
procedures include subjects' responses to TAT and Rorschach
cards. The responses are used by the experimenter (who
has five years of diagnostic and therapeutic training and
experience) as an informal means to screen out any obviously disturbed or anxious subjects before they view
any stimuli.l
During the actual stimulation procedures, the experimenter closely observes the subject. In the unlikely
event that any signs of distress are noted or if any subject voices concern or dissatisfaction, experimental procedures would be stopped immediately. The experimenter
would then discuss these concerns and completely debrief
the subject as to procedures and show him the stimuli.
No subject would be allowed to leave until all signs of
distress and concern had dissipated. Arrangements for
follow-up contact with ·the experimenter would be made.
As an added precaution against any delayed or lingering
effects, it should be noted that subjects remain with the
experimenter for about one-half hour following the last
stimulus exposures. At the end of the session, each subject is asked to share how he felt during the experiment
and to discuss any questions or concerns.2 Any subject
who wishes to see the stimuli is allowed to at this point.
In any event, subjects have the experimenter's phone
number and are encouraged to call with any questions or
concerns that may arise.
Given evidence from 30 years research and safeguards included in the present study, the author believes
that these procedures pose no risk for any subject. The
benefits of the study can be discussed on three levels.
First, most subjects in the similar Swanson (Note 1) study
reported enjoying the experimental procedures and being
1 Though numerous studies {Silverman, 1976) have
been carried out with various emotionally disturbed
groups without reported incident, the author is concerned
about how some subjects might interpret the experimental
procedures and so views this as an added precaution. Two
subjects were excluded on this basis in the earlier study
(Swanson, Note 1) .
2 In the Swanson (Note 1) study, no subject reported experiencing discomfort or distress (other than
occasional eye strain) while viewing stimuli.
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quite fascinated by the hypotheses tested. Second, the
results of the study will bear directly on several important theoretical issues. The notion of subliminal perception has had a long history of research and unusually
vigorous debate due primarily to the challenge it poses to
basic assumptions about human perception (Dixon, 1971) •
As noted earlier, Silverman's (1976) results are especially provocative for most current theories of visual information processing. Additionally, the current study
provides a partial test of some psychoanalytic propositions regarding cognitive processes assumed to operate
outside of awareness. Thirdly, Silverman (Note 2) has
speculated on the practical usefulness of subliminal
stimulation for psychotherapeutic purposes.
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